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ABSTRACT
PROPERTY TAX SHIFTING UNDER IMPERFECT COMPETITION: THEORY
AND APPLICATION
by
Mustafa Oktem
University ofNew Hampshire, December, 2001

The objectives of this dissertation are to examine, using hedonic methods, whether sitespecific environmental amenities can become sources of market power for property
management firms that control them and the extent to which such market power, if
present, affects property tax shifting from property owners to property renters. The
specific market examined in this dissertation is the vacation rentals market. The key
participants in this market are the property owners, the renters and a few property
management firms that manage the rental units in return for a fixed percentage
commission paid by the owner each time the unit is rented out. In this dissertation, a
proposition is derived by theoretically extending hedonic methods to accommodate both
market structure and the local public sector. This proposition is then used to empirically
examine the role of environmental amenities in creating firm-specific market power and
assess the extent to which such market power facilitates property tax shifting. The results
of this dissertation indicate that most of the market power exercised by the property
management firms is derived from the environmental amenity, namely the lake, and a
firm’s ability to shift property taxes may be greatly affected by the magnitude of market
power it possesses.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The hedonic technique is the most commonly used method for examining the
relationship between the price of a composite good and its attributes. Prior to the sixties,
the hedonic technique lacked theoretical foundations. Rosen (1971) remedied this
problem by developing a theoretical basis for using hedonic methods.
The hedonic technique has been used to analyze a variety of composite goods, one
of them being the residential housing market. Residential housing market applications of
the hedonic technique can be divided into two categories, based on what these
applications have tried to achieved:
The first category entails applications that involve retrieving the marginal price o f
housing attributes. Some of these applications are primarily concerned with disclosing
tenure choice and preferences with regard to housing attributes. Others try to measure the
value that residents place on environmental amenities such as clean air (Cobb, 1977;
Figueroa et al., 1996; Harrison and Rubinfeld, 1978; Lansford and Jones, 1995;
Palmquist, 1982.) Finally, a number o f these applications try to assess the impact of

1
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natural disasters such as earthquakes or changes in national socio-economic conditions on
the sales price of houses (Beron et al., 1997; Galster and Williams, 1994; Grass, 1992).
The second category is comprised of studies that examine the relationship
between property taxation and property values. Changes in the property tax rate should be
reflected in property values, because the property tax rate is based on the assessed value
of properties. This renders the residential housing market a good candidate for examining
the impact o f property tax changes. The literature examining the relationship between
property taxation and property values can be divided into two groups. The first group is
comprised of studies that examine the impact of property tax differentials on house
values. More specifically, these studies try to measure the degree to which property taxes
are capitalized into the price of the house once differences in public service quality are
controlled for (Wicks, Little and Beck 1968; Oates 1969; Smith 1970; Heinberg and
Oates 1973; Pollakowski 1973; Church 1974; Edelstein 1974; Wales and Wiens 1974;
McDougall 1976; Rosen and Fullerton 1977; King 1977; Chinloy 1978; Reinhard 1981;
Richardson and Thalheimer 1981; Ihlanfeldt and Jackson 1982; Rosen 1982; Cushing
1984; Yinger, Bloom, Borsch-Supan and Ladd 1988). The second group entails studies
that examine the relationship between property taxation and the rental price of housing.
These studies try to assess the degree to which property taxes are shifted from property
owners to property renters (Orr, 1968; Heinberg and Oates, 1970; Hyman and Pasour,
1973; Dusansky, Melvin and Karatjas, 1981). In spite of the plethora of studies that have
examined the relationship between property taxation and the rental/sales price of housing,
there still is no consensus on the magnitude of the relationship. In the context of the
owner-occupied housing market, there is no consensus on the property tax capitalization

2
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rate; the estimated tax capitalization rates range from zero percent (no property tax
capitalization) to one hundred and fifteen percent (over-capitalization of the property
tax). In the context of the rental housing market, there is no consensus on the extent to
which property taxes are shifted from property owners to renters.
One potential problem with both categories of studies is the following: Rosen’s
results are derived under the assumption of competitive markets. However, in reality, the
markets for composite goods can be less competitive, because product differentiation
creates market power. Hence, in order for the hedonic method to derive unbiased results
when used to analyze less competitive markets, the price-cost markup must be included
as a regressor in the hedonic regression.
There are some applications of the hedonic approach to less competitive markets
such as automobiles (Murray and Sarantis, 1999; Bajic 1988; Bajic 1993). These
applications do not address the issues that arise from applying hedonic methods to less
competitive markets. The empirical results in these applications are potentially biased
because price-cost markups are omitted from the regression equation.
Feenstra (1995) is the only study that provides some theoretical foundations for
extending hedonic methods to encompass imperfect competition. Feenstra (1995) derives
expressions for the profit-maximizing and social welfare-maximizing choice of attributes
given oligopoly competition.
There are also a number of studies that examine composite goods under less
competitive conditions, without using hedonic methods. Some of these studies examine
the welfare and efficiency effects of composite product taxation under less competitive
market structures (Anderson, Palma and Kreider 2001 A; Anderson, Palma and Kreider

3
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2001B). Other studies are primarily concerned with the separation of marginal prices into
a price-cost markup and a marginal cost component: Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995)
devise a model of oligopoly pricing in which products are multi-dimensionally
differentiated and apply it to the 1987 US automobile industry. The model allows for
different types of market conduct; it measures the price-cost markups resulting from
Bertrand equilibrium, Cournot equilibrium and other mixed cases. Goldberg (1996)
investigates car dealer price discrimination. Goldberg estimates the price-cost markups
involved in car purchases under price discrimination. Taylor and Smith (2000) use a
series o f statistical procedures to retrieve the marginal cost of the rental price of vacation
rental properties to assess whether environmental amenities can become sources of
market power in the vacation rentals market.
In the context of the literature, in the broadest sense, this dissertation establishes a
formal link between hedonic methods, imperfect competition and property taxation. Past
studies that have used hedonic methods to analyze the relationship between property
taxation and the sales/rental price of properties have assumed highly competitive housing
markets. However, not all housing markets are highly competitive. In this dissertation,
the competitive markets assumption is relaxed.
The objectives of this dissertation are to examine, using hedonic methods, (1)
whether site-specific environmental amenities, such as a lake, can become sources of
market power for firms that control them and (2) the extent to which such market power,
if present, affects the relationship between property taxation and the rental price of
housing. To achieve these objectives theoretically, hedonic methods are extended to
accommodate both market structure and the local public sector. In the empirical part, the

4

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

magnitude of property tax shifting that is achieved by property management firms under
the current less competitive market structure and the magnitude that would prevail under
perfectly competitive conditions, are computed. The key task, in the empirical section, is
retrieving the marginal cost of the property attributes.
The specific market, examined in this dissertation, is the vacation rentals market
of the New Hampshire Lakes Region. The key participants in this market are the property
owners, the renters and a few property management firms that manage the rental units in
return for a fixed percentage of commission paid by the owner each time the unit is
rented out. The market operates as follows: The firm must decide on whether the
expected profits that accrue from managing a rental unit exceed the opportunity cost. The
firm’s decision on whether to manage the rental unit or not is based on the rental unit’s
attributes and the unit’s expected rental price. If the firm contemplates that the rental unit
is marketable at a profitable rental price, then a contract is signed between the property
owner and the firm. The contract renders the firm responsible for managing and
marketing the rental unit. In return for this service, the firm receives a commission from
the owner each week the unit is rented out.
New Hampshire is an ideal state to study property taxation, because of its unique
tax code. New Hampshire’s income and sales tax is confined to an income tax on
dividends and interest and a sales tax on meals and rooms respectively (Connor, England,
Kenyon and Shapiro, 1999,1). The absence of a broad sales and income tax renders
property taxes the prime source of state government finance. Furthermore, each locality
has its own property tax rate based on the average property value within the locality,
hence there is considerable variation in the property tax rate.

5
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The findings of this dissertation indicate that most of the market power exercised
by these firms is derived from the environmental amenity, namely the lake. More
specifically, the attributes that command very high premiums above their marginal cost
are those variables that are inherently linked to the lake, or are variables that allow the
renter to better enjoy the amenities provided by the presence of the lake. The most
important conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that financial incentives
exist for firms to conserve site-specific environmental amenities such as a lake, the ocean
etc.
Concerning property tax shifting, this dissertation discloses some interesting
findings: First, the rate at which the firms pass on the property tax from their clients, the
owners, to the renters is significantly high, and in some cases greater than 100%. This
implies that, in these specific cases, the firm is able to pass more than the owner’s
property tax liability onto the renter. The demand for vacation rentals in the New
Hampshire Lakes Region is primarily made up of out-of-state visitors, mostly from
Southern New England states. If the majority of the property owners are New Hampshire
residents, then this result may imply that tax exporting is taking place. On the other hand,
if the majority of the property owners are non-residents, then this result may suggest that
tax redistribution among non-residents is present rather than tax exporting. Second, a
significant portion of the property tax shifting achieved by Firm 1 and Firm 2 is due to
the presence of imperfect competition. The contribution of market structure to Firm 3’s
ability to shift property taxes is small. A general conclusion that can be drawn from this
finding is the following: In a less competitive rental housing market, depending on the
degree of the market power exercised by the firm, the structure of the market may

6
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significantly augment the firm’s ability to shift property taxes from property owners to
property renters. This result can be further interpreted as indicating that, in certain cases,
the simplifying assumption of competitive housing markets that all past studies have
appealed to may not be valid.

7

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review is organized into four main sections:
The first section, Section 2.1, reviews hedonic methods. This section is
subdivided into two parts. In Part 2.1.1,1 discuss hedonic methods under perfect
competition. First, the theoretical underpinnings of hedonic methods under perfect
competition are provided. Then, the residential housing market applications of the
hedonic technique are presented. In Part 2.1.2,1 discuss the studies that extend hedonic
methods to accommodate less competitive market structures.
The second section, Section 2.2, reviews the literature examining indirect taxation
of composite products under imperfect competition. This literature is very recent and
consists of only a few papers.
The third section, Section 2.3, reviews the literature examining the relationship
between local fiscal differentials and property values. This section is subdivided into two
parts. In Part 2.3.1, a comprehensive review of the property tax capitalization literature is
provided. In Part 2.3.2, the literature examining the relationship between property
taxation and the rental price of property is presented.
In the fourth section, Section 2.4, a discussion of the contribution of this
dissertation, in the context o f the literature, is provided.

8
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2.1. The Hedonic M ethod
2.1.1. Hedonic Price Analysis: The Case of Competitive Markets

2.1.1.1.

Hedonic Price Theory. The theoretical foundations of hedonic price

theory can be traced back to Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974).
Lancaster (1966) develops a model o f consumer behavior where utility is derived
from the characteristics of a good, as opposed to the good itself. He demonstrates that his
model embodies much more explanatory and predictive power than the conventional
model that is built upon the premise that individuals derive utility from consuming the
good itself.
Rosen (1974) provides a theoretical justification for the use of the hedonic price
technique as a means o f disclosing the marginal price of a composite good’s attributes,
under competitive conditions. In his analysis, the consumer/demand side of the market is
accounted for via a bid function. The bid function represents the willingness to pay of the
consumer for a product with a given vector of attributes, and a given level of income and
utility. The supply side is captured via offer curves. An offer curve represents the
reservation price o f the supplier for a good with a given vector of attributes and a given
level o f profits. The hedonic price schedule is determined by the interaction of the two
sides; it is a locus of tangency points between the bid and offer curves; each point
represents an equilibrium point. Hence, the hedonic price function represents the locus of
equilibrium points where a consumer’s willingness to pay is equal to the seller’s
reservation price, holding all other attributes, income, utility and profits constant. In
Cobb’s (1977, 215) words, the hedonic price function is a “joint envelope representing

9
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the equilibrium solution set to independent decisions made by consumers and producers
of attributes.” Therefore, the derivative of the hedonic price equation with respect to a
given attribute, for example attribute zj, is equal to the marginal bid function with respect
to zi which in turn is equal to the marginal offer function with respect to zi. This implies
that the derivative of the hedonic price equation with respect to attribute zi represents the
marginal/implicit price o f zi at market equilibrium (Osborne, 1996, 56-57 and Rosen,
1974, 38-54).
Rosen’s theory requires two assumptions:
First, the market for the composite good achieves equilibrium. Second, there are
many varieties of the composite good; enough so that the price function and the bid and
offer curves can be assumed continuous (Palmquist, 1991).
A more structured presentation of Rosen’s theory is provided below:
Let us assume that a composite good is made up of three attributes, namely a, b
and c. Then, the price of the composite good is a function of the following attributes and
can be represented as follows:
P = P (a, b, c)

(2.1)

Hence a utility-maximizing agent’s maximization problem is:
Max U = U(a, b, c, n) subject to Y = P„n + P (a, b, c), where n is the numeraire
commodity with a price, P„, equal to one, P is the price of the composite good, and Y is
income. Assuming utility-maximizing behavior with a, b, c and n as choice variables and
an interior solution to the utility-maximization problem, and assuming that preferences
are weakly separable in the composite good in question and its attributes, then the

10
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representative agent’s marginal willingness to pay for attribute a is equal to the marginal
price of attribute a.
The aforementioned utility-maximization problem can be specified using bid
functions. Let H = H(a, b, c, u, y; a ) be the locus of consumer type a ’s bids with
attributes a, b and c and income level y for a specified level o f utility.
Now the utility-maximizing agent’s maximization problem is expressed as:
Max H = H(a, b, c, u, y; a ) subject to u(y-H; a ) = u,

(2.2)

Solving for the utility-maximization problem in its new specification yields the
same results as before, namely that the representative agent’s marginal price for attribute
a is equal to his marginal bid with respect to attribute a.
The seller’s side of the market assumes that each firm chooses the type of good to
produce and its quantity, x. Then the firm’s profit is represented by the following
equation:
II = x. P(a, b, c) - C(x, a, b, c; t),

(2.3)

where C (*) represents the cost function and t is the vector denoting the index of
factor prices and technology. Assuming profit-maximizing behavior (via choice variables
x, a, b and c) and an interior solution to the profit-maximization problem, then the
representative firm will optimize with respect to attribute a by setting the marginal price
of attribute a equal to the marginal cost of attribute a. Analogous to the consumer side of
the market, if firm preferences are to be represented by offer curves, then the profitmaximizing quantity o f attribute a is achieved at the point where the marginal offer
function with respect to attribute a is equal to the marginal cost of attribute a.

11
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Combining the consumer side of the market with the supplier side, in equilibrium,
the marginal price of attribute a is equal to the marginal offer and marginal bid functions
with respect to attribute a.

2.1.1.2.

Applications of the Hedonic Technique to the Residential Housing

Market. There are a plethora of studies that have applied hedonic methods to the
residential housing markets.
Most of these studies have attempted to quantify the value that consumers place
on environmental amenities such as clean air, and their willingness to pay for a reduction
in environmental disamenities such as pollution, highway noise etc. The sheer volume of
these studies renders it impossible to review each one individually. Hence, in this section,
only the general review articles that address the important issues, with specific mention
of the more influential papers, are considered.
The first of these articles is Smith and Huang (1995). Smith and Huang (1995)
conduct a meta-analysis of hedonic property models for purposes of assessing the
efficacy of hedonic models in valuing clean air. They provide a statistical summary of
marginal willingness to pay estimates for pollution reduction, hereafter MWTP, for
hedonic studies published between 1967 and 1988. Their methodology involves
correlating the MWTP obtained from each hedonic model to its structural attributes.
These structural attributes include real per capita income, the conditions of local housing
markets, air pollution and other important features. The results of the study indicate that
there is a consistent correlation between the marginal value placed on reducing air
pollution in a given study and the level of air pollution in the city, the average income of

12
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its population and other considerations that pertain to the implementation of the hedonic
study (Smith and Huang, 1995, 209-215).
The second general review article is Palmquist (2000). Palmquist (2000) provides
a comprehensive review of the important issues involved in using hedonic methods to
measure willingness-to-pay for improvements in environmental quality and the papers
that address these issues. The most important of these issues and the accompanying
papers that address these issues are briefly discussed below:
One problem common to all hedonic studies is the correct identification of the
extent of the market. Since the hedonic price schedule represents the locus of equilibrium
points within a market, all observations that are used to estimate a hedonic equation must
come from a single market. If the hedonic price equation is correctly specified in terms of
functional form and there are no omitted variables, a simple F-test is sufficient to separate
a geographic location into separate markets. However, since this is very rarely the case,
using F-tests is not methodologically sound. Palmquist discusses the problems that arise
from treating several markets as one single market (Palmquist, 2000, 26-27).
Another important problem is the correct specification of the functional form. In
the past, linear, semi-log and log-linear functional forms have been used. Halvorsen and
Pollakowski (1981) recommend the use of the quadratic Box-Cox functional form due to
its considerable flexibility. However, Cropper et al. (1988) find that the quadratic BoxCox functional form performs well when all relevant attributes are included in the
hedonic equation. They also find that, in the presence of omitted attributes, simpler
functional forms perform better than the quadratic Box-Cox functional form (Palmquist,
2000, 28-29).

13
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Another econometric issue addressed by Palmquist (2000) is multicollinearity.
Atkinson and Crocker (1987) and Graves et al. (1988) examine the problems that arise
from the presence o f multicollinearity. Atkinson and Crocker (1987) conclude that
multicollinearity contributes significantly to coefficient instability. Graves et al. (1988)
find that the coefficient of their visibility variable is significantly sensitive to the
inclusion of various combinations of some “not-so-relevant variables”, while their
pollution measure is unaffected (Palmquist, 2000, 34),
Another important challenge faced by researchers is identifying the appropriate
unit or measure of the attribute. The ideal measure of an attribute is one that is consistent
with the way agents perceive the attribute. This issue is more relevant to environmental
attributes (Palmquist, 2000, 33). Murdoch and Thayer (1988) test the hypothesis that the
correct specification o f the hedonic price function should employ mean levels of
environmental quality. The test is a mean specification test that involves two types of
regressions: The first includes probabilities of various levels of environmental quality as
explanatory variables. The second is the restricted version; the mean environmental
quality variable is the only measure of environmental quality. Specification error tests
indicate that the restricted version gives rise to biased estimates (Murdoch and Thayer,
1988, 143-146).
Finally, there is no consensus on the length of time that is required for property
values to fully absorb the impact of an environmental change. Palmquist notes that
information availability and expectations are the key factors that determine the length of
time. He reviews the empirical work ofKohlhase (1991), Kiel and McCain (1995) and

14

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Dale, Murdoch, Thayer and Waddell (1999) to shed further light to this issue (Palmquist,
2000, 41-42).
Residential housing market applications of the hedonic method are not limited to
studies that measure environmental quality and willingness-to-pay for improvements in
environmental quality. The hedonic approach has been employed to examine other
interesting questions concerning residential housing. The more recent of these
applications are provided below:
Grass (1992) investigates the question of whether public investment in heavy rail
transit systems increases residential property values. His dataset encompasses several
neighborhoods in the Washington D C area. The study reveals a robust positive
relationship between investment in transit systems and property values (Grass, 1992, 139146).
Galster and Williams (1994) investigate the impact of dwellings of the mentally
disabled on property values between 1989 and 1992. Their hedonic price equation is
comprised of neighborhood attributes, housing attributes and a set of variables denoting
proximity to mentally disabled homes. The results of their study indicate that proximity
to mentally disabled dwellings has a significant negative impact on property values
(Galster and Williams, 1994, 467-475).
Lansford and Jones (1995) utilize the hedonic price approach to measure the
recreational and aesthetic (RA) value of a lake in the Highland Lakes Region of Texas.
Their dataset includes the property sales that occurred between January 1988 and
December 1990. These are their most significant findings: Distance to the lake, scenic
view and waterfront location all have statistically significant coefficients. Waterfront
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properties possess a premium price. Water access properties also possess a premium
price, however this premium rapidly declines as the distance between the property and
the water increases.
Beron, Murdoch, Thayer and Vijverberg (1997) investigate the impact of the 1989
Loma Prieta earthquake on residential housing prices in the San Francisco Bay area.
Their hedonic regression includes community attributes, housing quality attributes,
earthquake hazard measures and geological measures. Their empirical results indicate
that house prices fell after the earthquake. The conclusion that Beron et al. (1991) draw
from this finding is that consumers had ex-ante overestimated the earthquake hazard. In
the light of this finding, Beron et al. (1991) suggest that a greater allocation of resources
should be devoted to earthquake risk communication (Beron, Murdoch, Thayer,
Viyverberg, 1997, 101-113).

2.1.2. Hedonic Price Analysis: The Case of Imperfect Competition

One of the key assumptions o f hedonic price theory is that the market reaches
equilibrium. Hence, one issue that needs to be addressed in order for hedonic price theory
to encompass imperfect competition is whether a Nash equilibrium exists within an
imperfectly competitive market where firms produce composite goods.
Feenstra (1995) develops a model whereby each firm chooses attributes and
prices simultaneously, while treating the prices and attributes of other firms as fixed.
Such a formulation allows for firms to be treated as Cournot competitors. In Feenstra’s
model, the price o f the composite good does not depend on the amount consumed of the
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composite good, but rather on the amount consumed of the attributes that make up the
composite good. Firms are able to produce multiple varieties of each good. Feenstra
(1995) first considers the case where each variety is produced by one firm. Feenstra
(1995) shows that a Nash equilibrium exists when the profit maximization problem is re
specified to hold utility constant. The Nash equilibrium level of price and attributes are
computed for the case where each variety is produced by one firm.1 Using this result an
expression is derived which can be construed as follows: The marginal cost and marginal
value of an attribute differ from one another by a level that is proportional to the pricecost markup o f the product and the elasticity of substitution between the product’s
quality-adjusted price and the attribute. The model is extended by allowing for product
competition in a given variety. In this case, competition in prices yields the well known
Bertrand result, namely price and marginal cost equality. Feenstra (1995) also computes
the socially optimal level o f attributes.
Another important question examined in Feenstra (1995) is how a change in
attributes and prices affects aggregate utility. To this end, exact hedonic price indexes are
developed. A hedonic price index is exact if it is equal to the ratio of two expenditure
functions in two periods at a constant quality adjusted price (but changing prices and
attributes). The exact hedonic price indexes provide bounds on the expenditure necessary
to maintain a given level of utility when prices and attributes are changing.
Finally, Feenstra (1995) investigates the possibility of estimating the marginal
price of attributes, using a hedonic price regression, under imperfect competition. He
shows that if marginal costs are semi-log in attributes, quality-adjusted prices along with

1 This is the case that is applicable to my case study. In my model, each rental property is managed by only
one firm and no two properties are identical.
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the utility functions take on a special form, whereby each is homogeneous to degree one,
the coefficients of the hedonic regression represent the marginal price of the attribute
relative to the cost of the product.
Taylor and Smith (2000) use Feenstra’s results to examine whether site-specific
environmental amenities can become sources of market power through product
differentiation. They propose a methodology for recovering the marginal cost of housing
attributes, in an imperfectly competitive housing market, from the hedonic price
regression. Their application involves firms that manage vacation rentals in the North
Carolina Outer Banks coastline. Their dataset encompasses several thousand beach
rentals rented out by four firms. First, firm-specific hedonic rent functions are estimated.
Second, firm-specific residual demand models are constructed for purposes of disclosing
the market power exercised by each firm. Finally, marginal cost estimates for sitespecific environmental amenities are recovered. Taylor and Smith’s results indicate that
site-specific amenities can become sources of market power for real estate rental firms.
The most important shortcoming ofFeenstra (1995) and Smith and Taylor (2000)
is the absence o f any formal treatment of the local public sector. Neither paper gives any
consideration to issues pertaining to taxation and local public service quality. Feenstra‘s
theoretical model does not account for the local public sector. Smith and Taylor do not
include the property tax rate and public service quality variables as regressors in their
hedonic rent regressions.
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2.2. Taxation Under Imperfect Competition

The literature examining taxation under perfect competition and monopoly is well
developed. However, in the past decade, there has been a growing interest in
understanding the effects o f taxation under market structures other than perfect
competition and monopoly. This interest has been stimulated by the realization that most
market structures fall between these two polar cases.
Earlier studies examining taxation under imperfect competition have analyzed
Cournot competition with a homogenous product (Stern 1987; Besley 1989; Delipalla
and Keen 1992; Skeath and Trandel 1994; Hamilton 1999). One shortcoming of Cournot
competition is that firms are modeled as competing in quantities, not prices. However, in
reality, firms almost always compete in prices (Tirole, 1988, 224). Also, firms that
compete in imperfectly competitive markets almost always produce composite products.
In the light of these facts, more recent studies have modeled firms as Bertrand
competitors producing a composite good (Anderson, Palma and Kreider 2001 A;
Anderson, Palma and Kreider 200IB). As a result, the literature examining taxation under
imperfect competition is divided into two categories. The first encompasses the studies
that model firms as Cournot competitors producing a homogenous product. The second
accounts for the more recent studies that model firms as Bertrand competitors producing
a composite product.
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2.2.1. Taxation Under Imperfect Competition: Homogenous Product Taxation
Under Cournot Competition

Stem (1987) is one of the first papers to examine the effects of taxation of a
homogenous product under market structures outside of the two polar cases of perfect
competition and monopoly. Stern compares, within a Cournot framework, the impact of
introducing an excise tax into an oligopoly market and a monopolistically competitive
market. His analysis assumes that the number of firms is fixed. He shows that the price
increase effect of the tax will be higher in the case of monopolistic competition if and
only if the tax reduces profits for the given number of firms. He demonstrates that if the
elasticity o f demand is sufficiently low, the excise tax may give rise to higher profits for
the firms.
Besley (1989) extends the work of Stem (1987) by examining homogenous
product taxation under imperfect competition, when firms are free to enter and exit the
industry. Hence, Besley (1989) relaxes Stern’s fixed number of firms assumption. Given
a homogenous product and a fixed number o f firms, the imposition of a small tax in an
oligopoly market always leads to welfare reduction. Using a Cournot model, Besley
(1989) shows that, with entry, such a tax may be welfare increasing (Besley, 1987, 359367).
Delipalla and Keen (1992) extend the literature by devising a framework that
allows welfare comparisons of different taxes for a homogenous product under imperfect
competition. Specifically, they compare the welfare effects of a unit and ad valorem tax.
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They show that, for a homogenous product under Cournot oligopoly, a shift from a unit
to an ad valorem tax, holding government revenue constant, is always welfare increasing.
Skeath and Trandel (1994) build upon the work of Delipalla and Keen (1992) by
providing a Pareto comparison of an ad valorem and unit tax for a homogenous product
under monopoly. Delipalla and Keen (1992)’s criterion for comparing the two forms of
taxation is welfare-maximization. Skeath and Trandel (1994) extend the work of
Delipalla and Keen (1992) by adopting a Pareto criterion. They show that for any unit tax
imposed on a monopoly that produces a homogenous product, there exists an ad valorem
tax that is Pareto superior (produces larger profits, tax revenue and consumer surplus).
The only shortcoming of this result is that it applies only to a monopoly. Skeath and
Trandel try to generalize this result to all Cournot-Nash oligopolies. They demonstrate
that their result may extend to Coumot-Nash oligopoly only if the tax is sufficiently
large. They show that this critical tax level is affected by the market demand curve and
the number of firms present in the market.
The results ofDelipalla and Keen (1992) and Skeath and Trandel (1994) can only
be used in the context of the unit and ad valorem tax. Hamilton (1999) tries to generalize
the theoretical results derived by Delipalla and Keen (1992) and Skeath and Trandel
(1994) to a wider range of tax instruments. He considers two market structures, the
Generalized Cournot model and the Free Entry Oligopoly. Both are homogeneous
product oligopoly markets, where firms compete in quantities. The only distinction
between the two is that the latter allows for free entry and exit into the industry. For each
of the two market structures, he derives the necessary and sufficient conditions for tax
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overshifting to take place. Furthermore, he develops a set of criteria that allows for
welfare comparisons. His results are applicable to a broad range of tax instruments.

2.2.2. Taxation Under Imperfect Competition: Composite Product Taxation Under
Bertrand Competition

Anderson, Palma and Kreider (2001 A) examine the welfare consequences o f ad
valorem and unit excise taxes in an oligopoly industry characterized by differentiated
products and Bertrand competition. Anderson, Palma and Kreider demonstrate that both
the unit tax and the ad valorem tax may be overshifted, with the unit tax more likely to be
over shifted than the ad valorem tax. They also show that, under certain demand curvature
conditions, both a unit tax and an ad valorem tax will give rise to an increase in firm
profits and thereby lead to an increase in the number of firms in the long-run. Finally,
Anderson, Palma and Kreider show that the imposition of a unit tax or an ad valorem tax
gives rise to an increase in the long-run equilibrium consumer price.
Anderson, Palma and Kreider (200IB) compare and contrast the relative
efficiency o f a unit and ad valorem tax for differentiated products under imperfect
competition. Anderson, Palma and Kreider demonstrate the welfare superiority of the ad
valorem tax, in the short-run, in imperfectly competitive markets characterized by
product differentiation and Bertrand competition. They also show that the ad valorem tax
is welfare superior in the long-run as long as marginal costs are constant and equal across
firms. Overall, their analysis demonstrates that the welfare superiority of the ad valorem
tax is strongly contingent on the assumptions of symmetric costs and a fixed number of
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firms. They demonstrate that if aggregate demand is highly inelastic and firm costs are
asymmetric, then the unit tax may be more efficient than the ad valorem tax.

23

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2.3. The Im pact of Local Fiscal Differentials on Property Values

The literature examining the relationship between fiscal variables and property
values can be divided into two broad categories. The first category is comprised of
studies that examine the impact of fiscal differentials on house values. More specifically,
these studies try to measure the degree to which property taxes are capitalized into the
price o f the house once differences in public service quality are controlled for. The
second category entails studies that try to assess the relationship between fiscal
differentials and the rental price of housing. These studies are primarily concerned with
measuring the extent to which property taxes are shifted from property owners to
property renters once public service quality is controlled for. This section of the literature
review will closely examine both categories of studies.

2.3.1. Category 1: Capitalization of Property Taxes into Property Values

The literature on property tax capitalization is vast. However, before presenting
the theory and empirical findings concerning property tax capitalization, it is important to
discuss what is meant by this term and its relevance to public economics and public
policy. Property tax capitalization refers to the incorporation of the present value of the
expected future stream of tax liabilities into the value of property. Full capitalization
occurs when, after controlling for housing attributes, neighborhood attributes and public
services, the difference in property values is exactly equal to the variation in the present
value of the future stream o f tax liabilities. An enhanced understanding of property tax
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capitalization is important for the following reasons: First, the magnitude o f property tax
capitalization may provide information concerning the tax burden shouldered by the
property owner. Second, a high degree of property tax capitalization may imply that
residential and business location decisions are substantially influenced by fiscal
differentials. Awareness of the relationship between local fiscal differentials and location
decisions will help policy-makers devise local public policies that better fit the needs of
the community (Cushing, 1984, 1). Third, the magnitude of property tax capitalization
may also significantly impact the real estate market by influencing purchase and sale
decisions. In the absence of property tax capitalization, a property owner may be able to
evade the financial cost associated with a rise in property taxes by selling his/her
property. However, if full capitalization exists, the property owner is unable to evade this
financial cost, because the tax increase leads to an equivalent decline in the value of the
property (Bloom, Ladd and Yinger, 1983, 145).
Numerous studies have empirically examined whether better local public services
and lower taxes give rise to higher house values, as the theory suggests. These studies
have taken either one of two approaches, namely the amenities approach or the tax
capitalization approach:
The amenities approach is specified as follows:
Pj = a + E pZ jj + yT j,

( 2 .4 )

where P j is the price o f the jth property,

Zj

is the vector of structural and location-

specific housing attributes as well as local public services.

Tj

is the property tax rate.

Assuming that the tax rate does not change over time, full capitalization of the tax rate
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implies that y = {P[l- (l+r)'n]}/r. This approach assumes that the tax rate is simply
another housing attribute that affects the price of the house.
Inherent in tax capitalization approach is the notion that tax rates affect property
values in a manner that is different than housing and location-specific attributes. The tax
capitalization approach, assuming an infinite time horizon, is specified as follows:
P = S/(r - g + 5 + m + 1),

(2.5)

where P is the property’s value, S represents the annual value of housing services,
r is the discount rate, g represents the annual real market-wide appreciation rate of
houses, 5 denotes the depreciation rate, m is the maintenance cost and t is the property tax
cost of owning the house, (r - g + 8 + m) represents the net of property tax user cost of
housing.
The estimating equation used in the tax capitalization approach is:
Pj = Sj/(a + ptj),

(2.6)

where j is the jth house, P is the value of the house, a is the net of property tax
user cost of housing and t is the taxation cost of owning the house. Full capitalization, in
this specification, implies that p is equal to 1.
Following Bloom, Ladd and Yinger (1983), I divide the empirical property tax
capitalization literature into three categories, namely studies based on aggregate data,
studies based on cross-sectional micro data and studies based on data representing tax
changes.
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2.3.1.1.

Studies Based on Aggregate Data. Studies that fall into this category use

the amenities approach to examine whether a relationship exists between interjurisdictional differences in average property taxes and average house values, once all
house value determinants (including public services) are controlled for. The majority of
these studies find tax capitalization to be between forty percent and ninety percent, with
the exception ofHeinberg and Oates (1970), Pollakowski (1973), McDougall (1976) and
Cushing (1984). Heinberg and Oates (1970), McDougall (1976) and Cushing (1984),
based on their results, conclude that property taxes are fully capitalized into house values,
while Pollakowski (1973) finds no evidence of tax capitalization.
Studies based on aggregate data test the hypothesis of capitalization by regressing
median house values against property taxes, some average measure of public services,
structural attributes, neighborhood attributes and accessibility to employment (Bloom,
Ladd and Yinger, 1983).
Oates (1969) is the first and seminal paper that investigates capitalization using
aggregate data. All of the other studies that belong to this category are extensions of
Oates (1969). Oates studied fifty-three municipalities located in the New York
metropolitan area. He regressed the median value of owner-occupied houses on the
median number of rooms per house, the percentage of houses constructed since 1950,
median family income, the distance in miles from Manhattan, the annual expenditure per
pupil in public schools, the effective property tax rate (nominal tax rate times the
assessment ratio) and the percentage of low income families in the community with an
income of less than $3000 per year. According to his regression results, there exists a
positive and statistically significant relationship between house values and public
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services, and a negative and statistically significant relationship between house values
and the effective property tax rate. Using a discount rate of five percent, Oates finds that
“approximately two thirds” of the effective property tax is capitalized into the value of a
house. He also finds that the positive impact of increased school expenditures on property
values is approximately offset by the decrease in property values resulting from the
increase in property taxes (to finance the additional school expenditures). His findings, in
general, support the view that property taxes are capitalized into property values (Oates,
1969, 959-969).
Pollakowski (1973) raises a number of econometric concerns over Oates’s (1969)
model. First, he discusses the omitted variable bias that arises from the role that Oates
(1969) assigns to his education expenditure variable. This variable is the sole public
service variable, and hence represents a general proxy for local public services. Second,
Pollakowski (1973) is critical of Oates (1969)’s median family income variable.
Pollakowski (1973) notes that this variable is not a determinant of house value, since the
value of a house depends on the demand of all of the potential demanders, and not only
on the demand of the current owner. Third, Pollakowski (1973) raises the reader’s
attention to the erroneous use of 2SLS by Oates (1969). He points out that the pre
determined variables need to be correlated with the tax variable and the public service
variable, but not the error term. He argues that Oates’s pre-determined variables do not
meet these requirements, Pollakowski (1973) re-estimates Oates’s model, using Oates’s
data, after remedying some o f these problems. His results completely refute the
capitalization hypothesis; he finds no evidence of capitalization (Pollakowski, 1973, 9941001). In response to Pollakowski’s criticisms concerning omitted variable bias, Oates
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(1973) adds non-school expenditures per capita into his regression equation. The
inclusion o f this variable raises the tax capitalization figure from sixty-six percent to
ninety percent (Oates, 1973, 1004-1008).
McDougall (1976) and Rosen and Fullerton (1977) extend Oates’s (1969)
empirical model by considering non-expenditure measures of public services. The
underlying argument in both papers is that expenditures represent inputs for local public
services; including the output in lieu of the input is a more direct and fruitful way of
measuring the influence of local public services on house values. Proxies for park and
recreation services, fire protection services, school services and police services are
included in McDougall’s (1976) specification, while Rosen and Fullerton (1977) use
student achievement test scores as their only measure of local public services.
McDougall’s results indicate that property taxes are fully capitalized into house values
and that individuals are responsive to the availability of environmental amenities
(McDougall, 1976, 436-441). According to Rosen and Fullerton’s results, eighty-eight
percent of the tax differential is capitalized in house values (Rosen and Fullerton, 1977,
433-440).
King (1977) re-estimates Oates’s (1969) regression equation using Oates’s data.
The only difference in King’s specification is that Oates’s (1969) town-specific effective
tax rate is replaced by a town-specific estimate of the property tax payment for the
median value dwelling. King argues that a tax variable specified as a percentage is
problematic, because any decline in a house’s value in response to a tax change will be
independent o f the value of that house. Hence, King’s motivation for re-specifying the
tax variable stems from his conviction that the tax burden is what is capitalized into the
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value of a house, not the tax rate. Assuming a five percent discount rate and a forty-year
horizon, as did Oates (1969), King finds capitalization to be approximately forty percent.
This figure is significantly less than that of Oates (1969) (King, 1977, 425-431).
Reinhard (1981) finds two flaws in King’s (1977) model. First, he notes that
King’s specification accounts for the capitalization of only one year’s tax payment.
Second, he claims that King’s use of the R-squared level as the maximum likelihood
criterion leads to a downward bias in capitalization rates. Using Oates’s (1969) data,
Reinhard re-estimates King’s regression equation after making the following changes:
First, he adjusts King’s regression model such that it tests the hypothesis of the
capitalization of the present value of future stream of tax payments and not the tax
payment of one year. Second, he uses the F-statistic as his maximum likelihood criterion,
instead of the R-squared statistic. Using a discount rate of 3.6 percent and an infinite time
horizon, Reinhard computes property tax capitalization to be 100 percent (Reinhard,
1981, 1251-1260).
Cushing (1984) takes a different approach and measures the extent of
capitalization by using a unique dataset. His dataset encompasses properties that are at
the border of two jurisdictions throughout the Detroit, Michigan SMSA for the year 1970.
This dataset, by default, controls for public services and inter-jurisdictional externalities.
According to Cushing’s results, property taxes are fully capitalized into property values
(Cushing, 1984, 317-326).
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2.3.1.2.

Methodological Problems Concerning Studies Based on Aggregate Data.

The problems that arise when using aggregate data are fourfold:
Simultaneity bias is one very important problem concerning aggregate data
studies. Theory tells us that tax rates have a negative impact on house values, ceteris
paribus. However, on average if house values are high, then a lower property tax rate is
required to finance a given level of public services. Most authors have recognized the
simultaneity problem, and have tried to remedy it through the use of two-stage least
squares. However, the appropriate use of two-stage least squares requires instrumental
variables that are uncorrelated with the error term, but highly correlated with the tax
variable. Unfortunately, most of the past studies have employed instrumental variables
that do not meet this criterion (Martinez-Vazquez and Ihlanfeldt, 1987, 127-140).
The second problem concerns the bias that arises due to omitted explanatory
variables. In order for the coefficients of the regression equation to be unbiased, all
determinants of the value of a house need to be included as explanatory variables in the
regression equation. This is very difficult to do, since there are many factors that
determine the value of a house. Omitted variable bias is likely to arise due to difficulties
and controversies surrounding the measurement of public services. Exclusion of an
important public service variable leads to spurious correlation between the component of
the error term related to the omitted variable and the tax variable, which in turn leads to
biased results (Palmon and Smith, 1998a, 1100-1101).
Third, in order to compute capitalization rates using both the tax capitalization
and amenities approach, one needs to select a discount rate and time horizon. The
estimated capitalization rate is extremely sensitive to the discount rate and time horizon
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used, because the present value of the total future tax burden is calculated based on a
selected discount rate and the expected length of occupation of the property. Since there
is no consensus on what the discount rate should be, authors have used a variety of
discount rates. This has contributed greatly to the dispersion in the estimated
capitalization rates (Bloom, Ladd and Yinger, 1983, 152-153). Do and Sirmans (1994)
derive a discount rate empirically by using a unique dataset in which taxes are expected
to be fully capitalized into house values. Assuming a one hundred percent capitalization
rate, they work backwards to compute the discount rate. They estimate a discount rate
equal to four percent (Do and Sirmans, 1994, 341-347).
The fourth problem is related to the specification of the tax variable. Each
specification o f the tax variable has its own set of idiosyncratic problems. Prior to King
(1977), most of the aggregate data studies employed the effective tax rate as their tax
variable. The effective tax rate is the nominal tax rate multiplied by the assessment ratio.
The assessment ratio is the ratio of the assessed value of property to its true market value.
King (1977) argues that aggregate data studies that use this specification are potentially
flawed, because its use implies that any reduction in the value of a house due to a tax
change is independent of the value of the house. To remedy this problem, King (1977)
uses tax payments instead o f the tax rate (King, 1977, 425-428). However, the use of tax
payments introduces other problems: First, the use of tax payments does not rid the
model of simultaneity bias. Tax payments equal the nominal tax rate multiplied by the
assessed value of each house. However, the assessed value is a function of the market
value. Hence, the causality between tax payments and market value goes both ways,
leading to simultaneity bias. Second, both the tax payment and effective tax rate
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specification are susceptible to measurement error resulting from differing municipalityspecific assessment practices (Bloom, Ladd and Yinger, 1983, 152).

2.3.1.3.

Studies Based on Cross-Sectional Micro Data. Cross-sectional micro data

studies generally examine the impact of both intra-jurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional
tax differentials on house values. Most of the studies that fall into this category have
employed the amenities approach, however there are some that have used the tax
capitalization approach. Cross-sectional micro data studies find a high degree of both
intra-jurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional tax capitalization (between forty and ninety
percent), with the exception of Wales and Weins (1974) (Bloom, Ladd and Yinger, 1983,
154).
Edelstein (1974) uses the amenities approach to conduct an empirical
investigation of the determinants of property value in the suburban Philadelphia area
known as the Main Line for the years 1967-1969. He regresses the value of a house on
structural housing attributes, neighborhood attributes, an accessibility variable and a tax
variable. His tax variable is the ratio of the tax payment of the house to the number of
bedrooms. Hence, his specification of taxation measures the tax paid per bedroom.
Edelstein (1974) finds a high degree of tax capitalization (Edelstein, 1974, 319-327).
Wales and Wiens (1974) examine intra-jurisdictional tax capitalization within the
municipality o f Surrey in Vancouver in 1972 and find absolutely no evidence of tax
capitalization. By limiting the scope of their study to one municipality, they evade the
problems associated with variations in assessment practices. Also, another advantage of
having only one municipality is that public services need not be considered in the
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regression equation, since public services are the same for all properties. The most
important contribution o f Wales and Weins is their attempt to separate the bias resulting
from spurious correlation from the coefficient of the tax variable, the effective tax rate,
and thereby produce a true measure of tax capitalization (Wales and Weins, 1974, 329333). However Bloom, Ladd and Yinger (1983) point out an important flaw in Wales and
Weins (1974). They demonstrate that Wales and Wiens’s procedure is correct if there is
no capitalization. However, in the presence of capitalization, they show that their
procedure is circular and does not accurately separate the bias from the coefficient of the
tax variable (Bloom, Ladd and Yinger, 1983, 155-156).
Church (1974) estimates a simultaneous equations model to assess the extent of
tax capitalization using the tax capitalization approach. His sample consists of single
family residential property sales that took place in five of the neighborhoods of Martinez,
California between 1967 and 1970. His simultaneous equations model is made up of two
equations. The first equation regresses the house value against a number of structural,
neighborhood, public service, other location-specific attributes and the effective tax rate.
The second equation is the effective tax rate regressed on the price of the house. Hence,
this specification assumes that the effective tax rate is a linear function of the house price.
The error term, in this equation, represents the variation in the effective tax rate due to
assessment error. The assessment error is the deviation of the assessed value of property
from its true market value. Church’s results indicate that overcapitalization of the
property tax takes place. Church attributes this partly to differing assessment practices
(Church, 1974, 113-122).
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Chinloy (1978) uses data from London, Ontario, to assess the extent of tax
capitalization. He uses a two-stage approach: First, he regresses the effective tax rate
against a number of household attributes such as gross income, number of household
members and deductions from income tax return. Then he regresses the value of the
house against the estimated tax rate from the previous regression model along with a
number o f structural housing attributes. Chinloy finds a significant level of tax
capitalization, but once he factors in the impact of the Canadian tax credit, he concludes
that tax capitalization is zero percent (Chinloy, 1978, 740-750).
Richardson and Thalheimer (1981) use the amenities approach and a unique
dataset to test the hypothesis of tax capitalization. Their sample is comprised of sales of
single-family residences in Fayette County, Kentucky, that took place between January
1973 and July 1974. The sample is exclusively made up of houses that have access to the
same local public services, have market values that are almost identical to their assessed
value and vary significantly in terms of taxes. Hence, their dataset is ideally-suited for
testing the hypothesis o f property tax capitalization. Richardson and Thalheimer regress
the price o f the house against a number of structural and neighborhood attributes as well
as a nominal tax rate. They use two specifications for function form, the first is a linear
specification and the other is a semi-log one. Using a discount rate of eight percent, and a
time horizon o f ten years, the linear and semi-log specifications yield a tax capitalization
rate of sixty percent and seventy percent respectively (Richardson and Thalheimer, 1981,
674-687).
Ihlanfeldt and Jackson (1982) use a methodology for testing intra-jurisdictional
tax capitalization that allows for the assessment error to be decomposed into two
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components, namely the systematic assessment error component and the random
assessment error component. Their data are confined to single-family properties located
within the central city of Saint Louis between 1976 and 1977. They estimate two versions
o f a hedonic price regression, one where the tax rate is included as an independent
variable and one where it is not. Then, they regress the difference in the estimated house
values obtained from the aforementioned regressions against the systematic and random
assessment error. The systematic and random assessment errors are calculated as follows:
First, the mean of the effective tax rate is computed. This is the tax rate that would
prevail in a world of “perfect assessment”, where no assessment error is made. The
difference between the actual taxes paid and the mean of the effective tax rate represents
the assessment error. The assessment error is regressed on the predicted market value of
property to obtain the systematic and random components of the assessment error.
Overall, this exercise yields estimates of the intra-jurisdictional capitalization of
assessment error. Ihlanfeldt and Jackson find that property tax assessment errors that are
unrelated to the value of the house are capitalized into the value of the house at a high
rate. They argue that this may contribute significantly to the large dispersion in the
estimated capitalization rates throughout the literature (Ihlanfeldt and Jackson, 1982, 417425).
Palmon and Smith (1998a) present an empirical analysis of tax capitalization,
which addresses a very important econometric problem that has plagued past studies.
This problem stems from spurious correlation between the error term and omitted public
service variables and gives rise to biased coefficients. Palmon and Smith (1998a) are able
to evade this problem through their use of a unique dataset which consists of large
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variations in taxes, but no variation in public services. The dataset is made up of 449
owner-occupied properties sold in Harris County, Houston, in 1989. Using the tax
capitalization approach and a discount rate of three percent, they find property tax
capitalization to be sixty-two percent (Palmon and Smith, 1998, 1099-1111).
Palmon and Smith (1998b), using the same dataset used in Palmon and Smith
(1998a), construct an empirical tax capitalization model that mitigates the following two
econometric problems: The first is the spurious correlation between the error term and
omitted public service variables that gives rise to biased coefficients. The second
concerns the user cost of housing capital. Since the user cost of housing capital is not
directly observable, past studies have had to use ad-hoc methods to determine the user
cost of housing capital. This has contributed greatly to the large variation in the estimated
capitalization rates. The authors evade the first problem by utilizing a dataset with large
variations in taxes, but no variation in public services. The second problem is resolved by
empirically estimating the discount rate through the use of both rental price and property
value data. Palmon and Smith’s (1998b) results indicate that taxes are fully capitalized
into property prices (Palmon and Smith, 1998b, 299-315).
Bartolome and Rosenthal (1999) criticize past studies for their failure to
appropriately account for the federal income tax code. Bartolome and Rosenthal claim
that past studies implicitly assume “that all families itemize, that families save in assets
for which interest is taxed on receipt, and that real interest income (as opposed to nominal
income) is taxed.” Bartolome and Rosenthal assert, based on recent research, that most
homeowners do not itemize and that savings for retirement is done via investing in taxdeferred assets. Furthermore, they note that nominal income is taxed, not real income.
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They use the amenities approach to estimate a model that corrects for the aforementioned
errors. Their sample is made up of owner-occupied properties, located in various parts of
the US, in the years 1985 and 1989. Their estimated tax capitalization rate is forty
percent, which is equal to the rate found in Yinger et al., (1988). After pointing out that
their results are consistent with that of past studies, they conclude that the specification
errors that result from inadequate and erroneous representation of the federal income tax
code offset one another (Bartolome and Rosenthal, 1999, 85-93).

2.3.1.4.

Methodological Problems Concerning Studies Based on Cross-Sectional

Micro Data. Studies based on cross-sectional micro data have several strengths relative to
those that are based on aggregate data. First, most of these studies include a very large
number of explanatory variables, mostly housing and neighborhood attributes. This
mitigates the problems related to omitted variable bias. Second, cross-sectional micro
data can be used to analyze both intra-jurisdictional tax as well as inter-jurisdictional tax
capitalization (aggregate data studies can only be used to examine the extent of interjurisdictional tax capitalization). Third, in the case of intra-jurisdictional tax
capitalization studies, the level and quality of public services are constant (since the
sample is confined to a single municipality). As a result, the problem of omission of
public service variables is avoided (Bloom, Ladd and Yinger, 1983, 153-154).
In spite of the aforementioned advantages, cross-sectional micro data studies face
the same econometric problems that have plagued aggregate data studies. Omitted
variable bias, although much less severe, is likely to be present. Like aggregate data
studies, the findings of cross-sectional micro data studies are driven by the choice of
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discount rate and time horizon. Furthermore, problems concerning the appropriate
specification of the tax variable are still present :
Studies that use tax payments as their proxy for taxation give rise to biased
coefficients and also a positively signed tax payment coefficient (theoretically, the
coefficient should be negative). This is a direct result of the tax payment variable acting
as a proxy for omitted variables such as expenditures on local public services (MartinezVasquez and Ihlanfeldt, 1987, 131-132).
The use of the effective tax rate (tax payment divided by the market value of the
house) in lieu of tax payments brings with it its own problems. This specification gives
rise to endogeneity bias, because the market value of the house appears on both sides of
the regression equation (Martinez-Vazquez and Ihlanfeldt, 1987, 133-134). Some studies
have attempted to resolve this problem via the use of 2SLS (Church 1974; Chinloy 1978).
Wales and Weins (1974), on the other hand, have tried to decompose the tax rate
coefficient into two components, namely the bias and the true tax rate coefficient. I have
presented Bloom, Ladd and Yinger’s (1983) critique of this approach in the previous
section. To sum up, the use of the effective tax rate as the tax variable produces
endogeneity bias. Even though researchers are aware of this problem, none of the
remedies presented thus far have been fully satisfactory.
Finally, both the tax payment and effective tax rate specifications are potentially
plagued by measurement error resulting from systematic (resulting from structural and
neighborhood attributes) and random assessment differences. Ihlanfeldt and Jackson
(1982) address the problem o f assessment error.
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2.3.1.5.

Studies Based on Tax Change Data. Studies that fall into this category try

to measure the tax capitalization rate by observing the change in house values in response
to institutional changes in property taxes. Full property tax capitalization implies that the
reduction in property values is exactly equal to the increase in the present value of the
future stream of tax payments. Hence, examining the change in property prices due to a
change in the tax rate is a useful approach to measuring the extent of property tax
capitalization. A change in the effective tax rate can be due either to a change in the
nominal tax rate or a change in the assessment ratio. Generally, nominal tax rates do not
change frequently. However, reassessment of properties occurs quite often. Hence, most
of the studies that fall into this category try to assess the rate o f capitalization by
examining changes in property values resulting from reassessment of property.
Wicks, Little and Beck (1968) try to measure the extent of tax capitalization by
measuring the response o f house values to property tax changes resulting from a general
reassessment of property in Missoula County, Montana, during 1965. They compare the
change in tax payment resulting from the reassessment to the difference between the
market price of the house and the estimated would-be price had there not been a
reassessment. Wicks, Little and Beck (1968) find that the average capitalization ratio is
nineteen to one, meaning that a dollar increase in property taxes leads to a nineteen dollar
decrease in the value of a house (Wicks, Little and Beck, 1968, 263-265).
Smith (1970) uses data from San Francisco to measure the impact of property tax
changes, due to a reassessment that took place between 1966 and 1968, on house values.
He finds an average capitalization ratio of fourteen and a half (Bloom, Ladd and Yinger,
1983, 157-158).
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Rosen (1982) tries to measure the magnitude of inter-jurisdictional tax
capitalization by examining the impact of California’s Proposition Thirteen on house
values in counties that fall in the San Francisco Bay area jurisdictions. Proposition
Thirteen is a statewide property tax limitation initiative that took effect in 1978. Rosen
regresses the change in the mean house price resulting from Proposition Thirteen against
the change in the property tax bill of the mean house, and a number o f property and
location-specific attributes. Rosen’s results approximate the inter-jurisdictional tax
capitalization rate to be seven percent (Rosen, 1982, 191-200).
Bloom, Borsch-Supan, Ladd and Yinger (1988) also try to measure tax
capitalization by examining the relationship between changes in house prices and
changes in property taxes resulting from reassessments that occurred between 1967 and
1974. Their data consist of houses sold more than once throughout a period of ten years
(Five years before and five years after reassessment) in seven Boston municipalities. In
using 2SLS to mitigate simultaneity bias, Bloom, Borsch-Supan, Ladd and Yinger
employ a theoretically derived first stage regression to identify instrumental variables, in
order to minimize the possibility of choosing instrumental variables that are correlated
with the error term. Furthermore, the discount rate is an estimable parameter in Bloom,
Borsch-Supan, Ladd and Yinger’s empirical model; this eliminates the need to choose a
discount rate. Bloom, Borsch-Supan, Ladd and Yinger’s estimates of the capitalization
rate range from forty percent to ninety percent (Bloom, Ladd and Yinger, 1983, 159-160;
Bloom, Borsch-Supan, Ladd and Yinger, 1988, 74-75).
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2.3.1.6. Methodological Problems Concerning Studies Based on Tax Change
Data. These studies utilize a first-difference approach. This approach mitigates the
problems associated with omitted variables, spurious correlation and measurement error
which are present in studies that fall into the other two categories. However, these studies
have problems o f their own. The first problem lies in identifying the property price that
would have prevailed had there not been the institutional change that altered property
taxes. Various approaches have been taken to eliminate this problem, however each
approach is ad-hoc. Second, all of these studies implicitly assume that public services are
not affected by institutional tax changes. This may not necessarily be the case (MartinezVasquez and Ihlanfeldt, 1987, 130).

2.3.2. Category 2: Property Taxes, the Rental Price of Property and Property Tax
Shifting

There are a number o f studies that examine the extent to which property tax
differentials lead to rent differentials (Orr, 1968; Heinberg and Oates, 1970; Hyman and
Pasour, 1973; Dusansky, Melvin and Karatjas, 1981). This exercise provides important
insights into the extent to which property taxes are shifted from property owners to
renters. This exercise is important for several reasons: First, an awareness of the extent
of property tax shifting implies an awareness of the tax burden shouldered by the
property owner and renter. An enhanced understanding of property tax incidence will
help policy-makers devise policies that better meet their objectives. Second, changes in
the relative magnitudes of property tax shifting and property tax capitalization may
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impact the real estate market. If the extent of property tax shifting and property tax
capitalization is high, then renting the property may be the best means to avoid an
increase in the property tax bill for the owner. On the other hand, if the magnitude of
property tax shifting and property tax capitalization is low, then the best way to avoid the
financial costs associated with increased property taxes is to sell the property.

2.3.2.1.

Studies that Examine Property Tax Shifting. Orr (1968) constructs an

empirical model to test the hypothesis that differential property taxes are shifted from
owners to renters. Orr’s data consists of properties that fall within 31 tax jurisdictions in
the Boston Metropolitan Area in the year 1959. Orr begins his analysis by noting that the
incidence of property taxation depends on the price elasticity of the supply of rental
housing and the price elasticity of the demand for rental housing. He argues that the
elasticity of demand is much more elastic relative to the supply, hence the incidence of
property taxes are borne, by and large, to owners. To buttress his proposition that
demand is more elastic than supply, Orr makes the following argument: American urban
areas are made up of many small jurisdictions that offer households a great choice of
locations with similar public services and attributes. Orr’s point is that the availability of
many close substitutes renders a more elastic demand. To test his proposition, Orr
regresses the median gross rent per room on the tax rate and a number of structural and
public service variables such as an index of the conditions of housing units in the taxing
jurisdiction, an education proxy etc. He argues that his empirical model is robust, but the
effective tax variable is statistically insignificant and adds very little to the explanatory
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power of his model. Based on this observation, he rejects the hypothesis of complete or
substantial tax shifting from owners to renters (Orr, 1968, 253-262).
Heinberg and Oates (1970) re-estimate Orr’s (1968) model using Orr’s data after
making some changes. They argue that Orr’s model is plagued by simultaneity bias.
Furthermore, they claim that the rent variable (median gross rent divided by the median
number of rooms) and some of the explanatory variables in Orr’s study relate to the entire
housing stock as opposed to the rental housing stock. To remedy the first problem they
re-estimate the model using 2SLS. To remedy the second problem they limit their sample
to the twenty-four jurisdictions that consist of rental data only and also re-specify the rent
variable. Their new rent variable is the ratio of the median rental price to median number
of rooms in rental units. The first modification gives rise to results that are very similar to
Orr’s. However, the second modification substantially reduces the explanatory power of
the model. Then, Heinberg and Oates re-estimate the model using sales data instead of
rental data, and find evidence of substantial capitalization of taxes into property values.
Based on these results, they conclude that property taxes on owner-occupied houses are
capitalized and that Orr’s methodology is not appropriate for making inferences on
property tax incidence (Heinberg and Oates, 1970, 92-98).
Hyman and Pasour (1973) empirically test the hypothesis that property tax
differentials give rise to rent differentials using data very similar to Orr (1968). Their data
encompasses one hundred and fifteen municipalities across North Carolina for the year
1970. They estimate the model using OLS. Their statistically significant tax coefficient
indicates that a ten cent tax differential among municipalities leads to a nine dollar
differential in the annual median rent per dwelling. For a rental unit valued at fifteen
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thousand dollars, they compute a sixty percent shift in the property tax from owners to
renters. Based on this finding, they conclude that a significant portion o f the property tax
is shifted from owners to renters (Hyman and Pasour, 1973, 303-306).
Dusansky, Ingber and Karatjas (1981) devise an econometric model that jointly
tests for property tax capitalization and property tax shifting from owners to renters.
Their dataset is made up of properties, in the year 1970, that belong to 62 school districts
in Suffolk County, New York. A five-equation system which represents a general
equilibrium model o f the rental and owner-occupied housing markets is simultaneously
estimated. Using a time horizon of twenty years, the authors find tax capitalization and
tax shifting, from owners to renters, to be sixty-eight and seventy percent respectively
(Dusansky, Ingber and Karatjas, 1981, 241-253).
Carroll and Yinger (1994) examine the question of whether the property tax is a
benefit tax in the context of rental housing. A benefit tax is a tax in which the individuals
who bear the tax burden are fully compensated via improvements in the quality and/or
quantity of public services that they have access to. Carroll and Yinger consider the case
in which renters are mobile (prior studies assume that renters are not fully mobile). They
devise a model that examines the impact of differential property taxes on rents in a world
where renters are mobile and renters consider the level of public services in deciding
where to live. Their empirical model consists of estimating two simultaneous equations,
namely a hedonic rent equation and a public service quality equation. Their empirical
results indicate that a dollar’s increase in property taxes gives rise to an improvement in
public services that is much less than a dollar. Hence, Carroll and Yinger conclude that

45

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the property tax is not a benefit tax, in the context of rental housing (Carroll and Yinger,
1994, 295-311).

2.3 .2.2.

Methodological Problems Concerning Studies that Examine Property Tax

Shifting. Most of the econometric problems present in cross-sectional micro data studies
are also present in the studies that examine the relationship between property taxation and
the rental price of property.
As in the previously discussed groups of studies, omitted variable bias and the
adequate representation of the public sector are common problems. Representing the
public sector with one general public service variable potentially gives rise to omitted
variable bias, whereas representing it with too many variables may create
multicollinearity.
Doubts concerning the appropriate specification o f the tax variable are also
prevalent, as in the case of cross-section micro studies. Furthermore, measurement error
arising from assessment error also contributes to the differing property tax shifting rates
reported in the literature. These issues are discussed in detail in Section 2.3.1.4.
Finally, endogeneity bias, a problem common to both aggregate data and crosssectional micro data studies, is not present in studies that examine the relationship
between property taxation and the rental price of property. This is due to the fact that the
dependent variable in these studies is the rental price of property rather than the market
value.
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2.4. The Contribution of this Dissertation in the Context of the Literature

There are a plethora of studies that utilize hedonic methods to empirically
examine (1) the willingness to pay of consumers for site-specific property attributes (2)
the relationship between property taxation and the sales/rental price of properties. A
detailed presentation of these studies is provided in the previous sections. The studies that
examine the relationship between property taxation and the sales/rental price of
properties implicitly assume highly competitive housing markets. This is a required
assumption since Rosen’s theoretical results are derived under this assumption.
There is very little work done in the area of linking hedonic methods to market
structure. Feenstra (1995) is the only study that provides some theoretical foundations for
extending the hedonic method to encompass imperfect competition. Also, there are a
number of applications that specifically address the separation of marginal prices into a
price-cost markup and a marginal cost component. Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) devise
a model of oligopoly pricing in which products are multi-dimensionally differentiated
and apply it to the 1987 US automobile industry. Goldberg (1996) estimates the pricecost markups involved in car purchases under price discrimination. Taylor and Smith
(2000) recover the marginal cost of property attributes for purposes of assessing whether
environmental amenities can become sources of market power in the vacation rentals
market. Although these papers contribute greatly to the literature on product
differentiation under imperfect competition, they do not account for the role of the public
sector. The scope of these papers does not extend to account for the effects of taxation.
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However, there are more recent studies that try to disclose the effects of taxation
of composite goods in imperfectly competitive markets. Anderson, Palma and Kreider
(2001 A) examine the welfare consequences of ad valorem and unit excise taxes in an
oligopolistic industry characterized by differentiated products and Bertrand competition.
Anderson, Palma and Kreider (200IB) compare and contrast the relative efficiency of a
unit and ad valorem tax for differentiated products under imperfect competition.
However, none of these studies use hedonic methods to examine these issues; their unit
of analysis is the composite product, not the composite product’s attributes.
In the context of the literature, in the broadest sense, this dissertation establishes a
formal link between hedonic methods, imperfect competition and property taxation. Past
studies that use hedonic methods to analyze the relationship between property taxation
and the sales/rental price of properties have assumed highly competitive housing markets.
However, not all housing markets are highly competitive. In this dissertation, the highly
competitive markets assumption is relaxed.
The objectives of this dissertation are to examine, using hedonic methods, (1)
whether site-specific environmental amenities, such as a lake, can become a source of
market power for firms that control them and (2) the extent to which such market power,
if present, affects the relationship between property taxation and the rental price of
housing. To achieve these objectives theoretically, hedonic methods are extended to
accommodate both market structure and the local public sector. In the empirical part, for
each property management firm, the rate of property tax shifting under the current less
competitive market structure is computed. Then, the magnitude of property tax shifting
that would be achieved by these firms under perfectly competitive conditions is
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computed. The key task, in the empirical section, is retrieving the marginal cost of each
housing attribute from its marginal price.
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CHAPTER IH

THEORETICAL MODEL

The purpose of this section is to theoretically extend hedonic methods to
encompass both market structure and the local public sector. Feenstra (1995) develops a
hedonic price framework that accommodates market structure. In this chapter, his work
is extended by incorporating local fiscal variables into the theoretical model. The local
fiscal variables are treated as property attributes. An equilibrium condition for the profitmaximizing level o f attributes is derived. The equilibrium condition is substituted into
the hedonic regression to derive an expression for the coefficient of all attributes.
In my case study, the composite goods are vacation rentals. The sections that
follow in this chapter are developed in correspondence with the application. Nonetheless,
the model applies generally to composite products with non-competitive market
structures.
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3.1. The Structural Assumptions of the Model

The structural assumptions of the theoretical model are as follows:
1)

There are a sufficient number of municipalities (each with a different tax rate) to
render the tax rate a continuous variable.

2)

Renters are aware of the potential for property tax shifting from owners to renters
(it is conjectured that a higher tax rate will result in a higher rental price). Hence,
holding all other housing attributes constant, renters will derive a higher level of
utility from a rental property with a lower tax rate.

3)

Owners do not use these vacation rental units as their primary residence.
Therefore, they are perfectly mobile in the sense that they can sell their property
and purchase another property, in the same municipality or a different one, with
negligible transaction costs.

4)

Each rental property is managed by only one firm.

5)

The financial incentives of the property management firms are perfectly aligned
with the joint incentives of their clients, the owners, such that there are no
conflicts of interest. The content of this assumption may be better elucidated with
the following analogy: If the clients of a particular firm were to form a “coalition
of owners” to manage their properties, it would make no difference whether the
profits of this coalition or the firm are maximized; both would yield identical
results. Hence each management firm may be thought of as a coalition of owners.
The first three assumptions allow for the tax rate to be treated as a choice variable,

in both the renter’s utility function and the property owner’s cost function. Hence, like
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any other attribute, the tax rate enters into the model through the rental price function and
the cost function. The fifth assumption eliminates the potential for a principle-agent
problem. In accordance with the fifth assumption, the management firms will be thought
of as coalitions of owners, when modeling firm behavior.
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3.2. Consumer’s Expected Demand

In modeling the demand for vacation rentals, a random utility model is used. In
property value applications of random utility models, each consumer makes a discrete
choice between i properties. The consumer knows all of the attributes of the property and
also his/her preferences. However, the exact specification of the true utility function is
not known to the researcher, hence the perceived utility derived from house i is measured
with error, s = (si,...., eN). The random error terms are distributed across properties
according to the joint distribution function F(e). Each consumer selects the property that
maximizes his/her level of utility. Hence, the joint distribution function F(s) measures the
probability that the utility of renting unit i yields the highest utility relative to any other
unit. The functional form of F(e) and the distributional assumptions concerning e
determine the functional form of the expected demand functions (Palmquist, 2000, 5254).
The first step in deriving consumer’s expected demand is choosing the functional
form for the observed/perceived utility function. Earlier studies have used a linear
specification for the utility function. In this specification, the random term, the attributes,
price and income all enter linearly, hence this specification is commonly referred to as
the Linear Random Utility Model. The appeal of this model stems from its ease of
estimation. However, because the attributes and income enter linearly, the marginal
utility o f the attributes and income are constant (Palmquist, 2000, 52-53). In my
theoretical model, a more general utility function, previously used by Swan (1970) and
Fisher and Shell (1972), is used which allows for a non-constant marginal utility of
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attributes and income. The utility function for a representative consumer (renter) used in
my theoretical model, in indirect form, is:

vit = ln<j>0 (y) - B - ln<j)it(pit,

(3.1)

Fit) + sit

i=

where z = the vector of K attributes of the rental unit, F = the tax rate, p = the
rental price, y = in c o m e , i =
s p e c ific a tio n ,

ith rental

unit and t = time measured in weeks. In this

a representative individual derives utility, in week t,

fro m

consuming a

numeraire commodity, B (whose price is equal to 1) and renting vacation rental unit i. q =
<t>i(pjt, Zjt , Tit) is interpreted as a quality adjusted rental price and is the inverse of p;t =

7Cj(qit, z^ Ft). Hence, 7ijt(qit, zit, r it) = (fot'^pit, Zjt, Ft). Also it is assumed that the partial
derivative o f <j) with respect to z is greater than zero and Stfrt/dpit > 0.
Given the aforementioned specification of utility, the probability, according to the
distribution F(s) =F(si,...., eN), that rental unit i is chosen is:

Prit = Prob [vit 1113.x Vjt]

(3.2)

j = 1,..., N,

Let Xjt —1 if rental unit i is chosen and x;t = 0 if not. Then, the expected demand
for rental unit i, in week t, is:

E(xit | Prit) = I Prit Xit = Prit + (1 - PnO*0 = Prit

The expected market demand of the ith unit at time

t,

(3.3)

X;t, is simply the expected

demand for rental unit i, Prjt, multiplied by the number of individuals in the market, M:

Xjt = MPrtt

(3.4)
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Equation (3.4) states that the aggregate demand for rental unit i in week t is equal
to the demand of a representative consumer multiplied by the number of individuals.
Since vacation rental properties are composite products, aggregation over
consumers is an issue that needs to be addressed. More specifically, the relationship
between the aggregate utility over all individuals and the expected market demand needs
to be established. To achieve this, a theorem due to McFadden (1878, 1983) is used.
McFadden (1978,1983) shows that under a broad family of distribution functions, F(e),
there exists an aggregate indirect utility function V (over all individuals) such that
Xjt = -(d V / dp^)/(dV / d y ).2 This implies that the aggregate demand in equation (3.4) can
be obtained from a utilitarian social welfare function, V.

2 Feenstra (1 9 9 5 )’s presentation o f the theorem is provided in A ppendix 8.1.
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3.3. The Coalition of Owners’ Profit-Maximizing Choice of Attributes and Tax Rate

The analysis concerning the behavior of each Coalition of Owners entails the
following assumptions:
1)

Any Coalition of Owners chooses rental price, ph, and attributes, z;t, for the ith
rental unit simultaneously, while considering the price and quantity of other
coalitions as fixed. The subscript, t, represents time, in weeks.

2)

Per unit costs, Cjt(zjt, Fit), that accrue from managing the ith rental unit in week t
depend on the ith rental unit’s attributes in week t and the tax rate for the i* rental
unit, Fit in week t (the tax rate varies on an annual basis).

The following equation represents a Coalition of Owners’ annual profit
maximization problem3:

Max

S I [pif c/Zjp Tit)] Xjt>

(3.5)

pit, Zjt. Tit 1 1

where X* is the expected market demand for rental unit i at time t as presented in
equation (3.4).

3 Typically, in the vacation rentals market the firm that manages a rental property charges a percentage of
the rent as commission. The commission can be incorporated into the model as a scaling factor of P*. As it
turns out, the analytical results are not affected by the commission when the commission rate is assumed
constant across i and t-a s is the standard practice in the vacation rental market. Hence, in the analytical
model, the commission rate is omitted. P* may be thought of as the after-commission rental price.
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Xjt can be further presented as follows:

Xit = -(aV/Sp,t)/(5V/SY)

(3.5a)

= -<50*/%,) [(<5V/30it)/(5V/5Y)]

(3.5b)

- -{aik/aqu)'1[(3 v /a 0 it)/(av/aY)]

(3.5c)

Equation (3.5a) follows from McFadden (1978,1983). Simple manipulation of
equation (3.5a) yields equation (3.5b). Recognizing that the rental price is the inverse
function of the quality adjusted rental price, equation (3.5b) can be expressed as equation
(3.5c).4
Assume a Nash equilibrium at (p*a, z*a, r*a), where p*a denotes the Nash
equilibrium value for the rental price, z*-,t denotes the Nash equilibrium value of
attributes, r* a denotes the Nash equilibrium value of the tax rate and q*u = 0it(p*it, z*a,
r*jt) is the Nash equilibrium value of the quality adjusted rental price. Then, consider
alternative choices o f (pu, Zit, Fjt) satisfying pa - ?ta(q*a, za, Fjt). For such choices of (pa,
za, Fa) (holding q*a constant), arguments of V are unaffected, hence X;t changes only due
to (drta/dqa)"1. Thus, the condensed profit maximization problem becomes5:
Max
[7ta(q*u, za, Fa ) - ca(za, Fa)](57ta(q*a, za, Fa)/3qa)_1
za, Fa >0

(3.6)

Hence, in this specification, pa is endogenized to hold q*a constant.

4 In the forthcoming sections and chapters, the rental price and the quality adjusted rental price may be
referred to as the price and the quality adjusted price for simplicity.
5 Profits are assumed to be quasi-concave in the firm’s own prices and attributes to ensure that an interior
maximum exists. See Appendix 8.3 for a more detailed discussion of the required conditions for an
equilibrium to exist.
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The analytical model is structured such that the tax rate is a choice variable that
contributes to product differentiation. Hence, in this model, the tax rate is treated as a
property attribute. Thus, equation (3.6) can be further simplified by letting Ait denote the
vector of all property attributes for the ith rental property, including the tax rate:

A.it = Xit(zit, r it)

(3.7)

Substituting equation (3.7) into equation (3.6):
Max [7iit(q*it, Xit) - Cit(A.it)](03tit(q*it, A.it)/5qit)'1

(3.8)

A-st >0

Taking the FOC with respect to the k* attribute and setting it equal to zero yields:
[d7tit(q*it, Xit)/dXte - 3cjt(A,jt)/dA,ikt] (ckh(q*it, A^/Sq*)'1
- [>tit(q*it, A*) - Cit(A.it)](37tit(q*it, Xit)/5qit)'2[527rit(q*it, Xnydqitdha] = 0

(3.9)

Isolating dCjt(A,it)/0A,ikt and dividing through by (07iit(q*it, ?iit)/5qit)"1 yields :
3cit(A*it)/dA,jkt = c)7tit(q*it, A*it)/dA.ikt- [7tit(q*it, A.*it) - Cj(A*it)]
(57tjt(q*it, A,*it)/5qit)'1[527iit(q*it, 7i*it)/dqitdA,ikt]

(3.10)

Setting p* = 7i!t(q*it, A,*;t)and then dividing and multiplying by p*:
^ ( ^ ♦ ^ / O A i k t = 57tjt(q*it, A,*it)/5A.ikt - ( [ p * - Ch(A»*it)]/p * )

(djiit(q*it, A,*it)/aqit)'1[527Cit(q*it, A,*it)/5qit5A*i] p*
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(3.11)

Dividing and multiplying by drtit(q*it, X*jt)/3Xikt:
5cjt(A,*it)/0Xikt = 57tit(q’it,

A*it)/c^ikt - (97iit(q*it, X*jt)/dXikt) ([p*—Cjt(X*it)]/ p*)

(57Ch(q*it, X*it)/5qit)'1(^n:it(q*it, X*it)fdXiu)'1
[^7C;t(qV^*it)/%t3A,ikt] p*

(3.12)

Rearranging the terms yields the equilibrium condition for the k* attribute:
3cit(X*it)/5Xikt = a7tit(q*;t, X,*it)/5Xikt [1 - ([p -

ch(X*h)]/

p*) (l/o*ikt)]

(3.13)

where cs*M = (dn.Jdq.Ji d n J d X ^ lp * .jin .J d q .xdX-&1\ evaluated at (q*jt, X*t)
represents the elasticity of substitution between q* and Xjkt in the function 7ih(q*it, Xjt),
when 7Cit is homogenous to degree 1. Equation (3.13) may be interpreted as follows: The
marginal cost of the k* attribute of property i at week t depends on the marginal price of
the k* attribute, the price-cost markup of property i, and the elasticity of substitution
between qa and A,jkt in the function 7Cu(q*it, Xjt), when 7Cjt is homogenous to degree 1. When
the k attribute is the tax rate, F;t, equation (3.13) may be interpreted as follows: The
marginal cost of the tax rate, Fjt, depends on the marginal price of Fjt, the price-cost
markup for property i, and the elasticity of substitution between q;t and Fjt in the function
7ijt(q*it, Xjt), when 7ijt is homogenous to degree 1.
The equilibrium condition demonstrates that under imperfect competition the
marginal price of an attribute is not equal to its marginal cost. The marginal price of an
attribute is greater than its marginal cost by a margin that depends on the price-cost
markup of the property and the elasticity of substitution between the attribute and the
property’s quality adjusted price, in the price function, n, when n is homogeneous to
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degree 1. The marginal price of an attribute is equal to its marginal cost, as in the
competitive case, when the elasticity of substitution term, a, is equal to infinity. A a
equal to infinity implies that the attribute in question and the quality adjusted price of the
property are perfect substitutes.
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3.4. The Equilibrium Condition in the Context of the Hedonic Rent Regression

Assume that marginal costs are semi-log in attributes,

lneit -

(Xt

+ X P

Cjt( X j t) =

Ae2px+V Then:

(3.14)

kt^-ikt + V it

k=l

where a and P' are parameters and
dlnch/dlnXikt = (dlncit/dXjkt)( 1/c;t) = pkt

(3.15)

Adding ln(pu) and subtracting ln(ch) from both sides of (3.14) yields:

Inpit = a t + X P'kt^ikt + (lnpit - lncit) + vit
k=l

(3.16)

Suppose that pjt/cit is constant across i. Using a first order Taylor series expansion
at pit/cjt =1, (lnpit - lncit) « pit/cit - 1 . Replacing (lnpit - lncit) with pit/cit - 1 :

lnpit = a t + X P'ktAikt + (pit/cit- 1 ) + vit
k=l

(3.17)

Substituting the equilibrium condition, (3.13), and (3.15) into (3.17):
K

lnpit = at + X {(1/cit)
k=l

dTtJdhkt [1 - ([pit- Cit]/pit)(l/aikt)] }A.ikt

+ (pit/ca- 1 ) + vit

(3.18)
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Letting yua = divmddXikt - {d\mzAldXM){ll%X) and regrouping the terms:
K

K

lnpit = a t + I (pit/cit)y'iktXikt + (p»t/cit -1)[1 -Efrat Wa>kt)] + vit

(3.19)

K

Feenstra (1995) demonstrates that the term, (pa/e* -1 ) [1 - Z(Yikt ^ikt/ctikt)],
k=l
disappears if the quality adjusted price, qa = 0a(pa, ^ h), is of the form:

0it(Pit? ^it)

^it [ {Pit ” git(^-it) }/ha(^-it)]

(3.20)

where vj/it > 0, \|Fa> 0, ha > 0, dga/dXa>0 and hjt is homogeneous to degree l.6 In
this formulation, the function g is equal to the value that individuals place on the
observed attributes in terms o f the numeraire. The function h is a proxy for durability.
If the aforementioned condition is met, the hedonic price equation becomes:
K

Inpa = a t + E(pit/ca)y'ikt^ikt + vit
kr=l

(3.21)

According to equation (3.21), the coefficient of the kth property attribute (the
marginal price of the k* property attribute), is equal to the marginal cost of the k*
property attribute expressed in elasticity form, Slnpa(qa, za)/5Xikt - y'ikt, multiplied by the
price-cost ratio, (pa/ca). In the case where X_kt = fa, equation (3.21) is interpreted as
follows: The coefficient of Fa, the property tax rate, is equal to the marginal cost of the
property tax expressed in elasticity form, multiplied by the price-cost ratio, (pa/ca)Using the results derived in equation (3.21), and the fact that, in a non
competitive setting, a firm’s cost-price ratio is equal to (1+R) where R is the inverse

6 Feenstra (1995)’s presentation of this result is provided in Appendix 8.2.
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residual demand elasticity o f the firm (Taylor and Smith, 2000), the following
proposition is derived:
PROPOSITION: Given semi-log marginal costs in attributes, constant markups
over rental units, rational behavior on behalf o f firms, quality adjusted prices specified as
in equation (3.20) and the presence of a Nash equilibria, then marginal cost of any non
tax attribute can be recovered by multiplying the marginal price of the attribute by (1+R)
where R is the inverse residual demand elasticity of the firm. The marginal cost of the tax
variable can also be recovered by multiplying the coefficient of the tax attribute in
equation (3.21) by (1+R).
The functional form of the quality adjusted price, as expressed in equation (3.20),
needs to be explored a little further. If the durability proxy, h, is approximately equal to 1,
then the quality adjusted price becomes a linear function of the price and the value that
individuals place on the observed attributes in terms of the numeraire. On the other hand
if gj is equal to 0, this means that the value that individuals place on the observed
attributes in terms of the numeraire is equal to 0. If this is the case, then the quality
adjusted price is simply the ratio of price and durability (Feenstra, 1995, 637-638). In this
specific case, the price function, p, is weakly sepearable in its arguments, namely the
durability proxy and the quality adjusted price.
In the empirical section of this dissertation, the aforementioned proposition is
used to retrieve the marginal cost of the attributes.
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CHAPTER IV.

EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION

4.1. Overview of the Issues

The purpose o f this dissertation is to examine (1) whether site-specific
environmental amenities, such as a lake, can become a source of market power for firms
that control them and (2) the extent to which such market power, if present, affects the
relationship between property taxation and the rental price of housing. In a market
characterized by a high degree of competition, a basic hedonic price function would
adequately describe the relationship between the price of a house and its corresponding
attributes. However, the vacation rentals market is characterized by imperfect
competition. As seen in Section 3.4, the hedonic price function describes a relationship
between the price and housing attributes exaggerated by the price-cost ratio. Hence, the
use o f conventional hedonic methods for purposes of estimating the marginal cost of
housing attributes can be misleading. The conventional hedonic price regression does not
provide any means to separate the marginal cost of attributes from the price-cost ratio.
Consequently, the key challenge is to retrieve the marginal cost of each attribute from its
coefficient, in the hedonic regression.
Taylor and Smith (2000) propose to estimate the price-cost markup for each firm
by estimating the so-called firm-specific residual demand model. The price-cost markup
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is then employed to retrieve the marginal cost of each attribute from its estimated
marginal prices in the hedonic regressions. In the empirical section of this dissertation,
the framework of Taylor and Smith (2000) is used to estimate the price-cost markup and
retrieve the marginal cost of housing attributes, including the tax rate7. The estimation
procedure includes estimating hedonic price regressions, constructing quality adjusted
price and quality adjusted quantity indices, estimating residual demand models,
recovering the marginal cost of attributes and computing the rate of property tax shifting
under perfect and imperfect competition. The remainder of this chapter describes the
specific steps involved in the estimation procedure.

7 It is important to remind the reader that, under perfect competition, the marginal price o f an attribute is
equal to its marginal cost.
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4.2. Hedonic Rent Functions

In order to derive market power measures for each firm, firm-specific hedonic
rent functions are estimated for each year.
The hedonic rent functions are composed of attributes/variables that belong to one
of seven categories, namely price variables, season variables, variables that account for
property size, variables that account for housing quality, lake related variables, local
government appropriation variables and the property tax rate. The price variables denote
the rental price of each property for each season of each year. The season variables are
dummy variables that denote the season in which the property is rented out. There is very
little within-season variation in the occupancy rate across properties. However a
substantial amount o f seasonal variation is observed. To account for this, season dummies
are used. The housing size category consists of variables that convey the size of the rental
unit. Examples of such attributes include the maximum occupancy number and the
number of bathrooms. The housing quality category consists of variables that measure
quality such as whether the rental unit is classified as a contemporary unit, whether it has
a fireplace etc. The environmental amenity-related variables capture the impact that the
environmental amenity, namely the lake, has on the rental price of the rental unit.
Examples include whether the unit is waterfront or not, whether it has a view of the lake
or not. The local government appropriation variables are used as control variables for
measuring the impact of the property tax on the rental price. These variables include the
town-specific appropriations for highways and streets, appropriations for police services
etc. The final category is made up of one variable, namely the full value property tax per
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$1000 of equalized property value.
Three criteria are used in selecting the variables to be included in the final
specification o f each hedonic rent function: The first is theoretical. Real estate rental
agents were consulted and past hedonic studies involving the vacation rentals market
were scrutinized for purposes of determining which attributes are more valued by
customers. The second criterion is statistical significance. The final specification of each
hedonic rent regression includes all variables that are theoretically important. These
variables are almost always statistically significant. However, there are a number of
variables that are theoretically important, but not statistically significant. These variables
are also included in the final specifications in order to eliminate omitted variable bias.
The last criterion is multicollinearity. A substantial effort is made to eliminate the
potential for multicollinearity.
One of the biggest challenges facing the researcher is adequately representing the
public sector in the hedonic equation. Some papers have chosen to control for public
services with one general public service variable, while others have chosen to include
several more specific public service variables. Each approach has its own problems.
Representing the public sector with one general variable may give rise to omitted variable
bias. On the other hand, using several more specific variables may plague the hedonic
regression with multicollinearity. In this dissertation, the second approach is used. The
choice of public service variables to be included in each hedonic regression is greatly
influenced by efforts to minimize multicollinearity.
The public service variables and the property tax rate are lagged by a year in each
hedonic regression. The property tax rate for any given year is determined and made
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public the following year. Hence, firms make pricing decisions based on the previous
year’s tax rate.
The structure of the hedonic rent functions is as follows:
ln(Rental price) = F(dummy variables indicating season, housing size attributes,
housing quality attributes, lake related variables, local public
appropriation variables, the property tax rate)

(4.1)

Choosing the appropriate functional form for the hedonic rent equation is very
important, since different specifications for the hedonic rent equation embody different
implications concerning the relationship between property taxation and the rental price of
property. The two specifications commonly used in the literature are the linear and semi
log specifications. A linear specification implies that the extent of property tax shifting is
independent of the rental price of the property. This, clearly, is a very strong implication.
On the other hand, a semi-log specification implies that the extent of property tax shifting
depends on the rental price of property. Furthermore, as seen in Section 3.4, under the
semi-log specification, the coefficient of the tax variable can be viewed as the marginal
cost of the tax augmented by the price-cost ratio. To render the empirical model
consistent with the theoretical model, the semi-log specification is used.
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4.3. The Quality Adjusted Rent and the Quality Adjusted Quantity Indexes

The estimates of the hedonic rent regressions are used along with weekly
occupancy data to construct the following quality adjusted rent index:
Ln Pt = EtCPtkRtkj/TRt] InPV

(4.2)

where t denotes the week, k denotes the rental unit, Rtk is equal to 1 if house k is
occupied in week t, and zero otherwise. Ptk is the posted rental price of house k in week t,
P*tk is the predicted rental price of house k at week t.
The posted rental price represents the ex-ante pricing strategy of the firm.
Combining these prices with the ex-post reaction of consumers (the occupancy rates), in a
Stone price index-like formulation, yields an effective rent index that adequately captures
the market performance o f the firm.
A quality adjusted quantity index is constructed by dividing total revenue in each
week by the quality adjusted rent index.
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4.4. The Residual Demand Model

The residual demand technique is an econometric technique for measuring market
power that is especially well suited for industries characterized by a high degree of
product differentiation. Prior to the advent of the residual demand technique, any
statistical attempt to measure market power, in industries with substantial product
differentiation, required the estimation of cross-price elasticities of demand. Generally
estimating cross-price elasticities is difficult and the data requirements are substantial.
The residual demand method allows for measurement of market power without the need
to estimate cross-price elasticities (Baker and Bresnahan, 1988, 283-286).
The residual demand function is a semi-reduced form of a general supply and
demand system for all differentiated products in a given market. It provides a relationship
between the price and quantity of a firm, once the supply responses of all other firms
have been taken into account. In other words, it identifies the “residual” demand facing
the firm, once other firms’ supply responses have been accounted for. If there is no
significant correlation between price and quantity once the supply responses of all other
firms have been controlled for, then the slope of the residual demand curve facing the
firm is zero, which implies that the firm has no market power. On the other hand, a
negative and statistically significant correlation coefficient indicates that the firm is able
to exercise market power (Baker and Bresnahan, 1988, 283-285).
Following Baker and Bresnahan (1988), let Pi be the price index of Firm 1, the
firm of interest, Qi its own quantity, Q the vector of quantities for other firms’ products,
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Y the set o f exogenous demand variables and a 1 the parameters measuring own-price
demand elasticity, the income elasticity etc. for the market.
Then Firm l ’s inverse demand function is:
Pi =P1(Q1, Q, Y; a 1)

(4.3)

Firm l ’s supply response is given by:
Pi - M C^Qi, Wi, W; P1) = ^ (Q i, Q, Y; a 1),

(4.4)

where the marginal cost, MC, depends on firm-specific costs, Wi, industry-wide
costs, W, and supply parameters, p 1.
The inverse demand and supply curve for any other firm, Firm i, where i is not
equal to 1, is:
P i= P'(Qi, Q, Y; a ‘)

(4.5)

Pi - MC'(Qi, Wi, W; p*) = n*(Qi» Q, Y; a')

(4.6)

Simultaneously solving equations (4.5) and (4.6), for Q yields:
Q ==Qi (Q i,Y ,W , W*; a', p1),

(4.7)

where the superscript i denotes equilibrium level in the markets when all firms
except for Firm 1 have been accounted for.
Substituting equation (4.7) into equation (4.3) yields Firm l ’s residual demand:
Pi = R1 (Qi, Y, W, W‘; a , p'),

(4.8)

where a measures the joint impact of all firms’ demand parameters including
those ofFirm 1.
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The observable variables in the residual demand function are own quantity, the
demand variables, industry-wide costs, and firm costs for all firms except Firm 1. These
variables are functions of the structural parameters, a and f>\ hence the impact of these
unobservable structural parameters are captured through the observable variables.
Equation (4.8) is specified in the double-log functional form, which implies that the
coefficient o f InQ, denoted as R, is the inverse residual demand elasticity. An inverse
residual demand elasticity that is significantly less than 0 indicates the presence of market
power.

72

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4.5. Recovering the Marginal Cost of Attributes

In the theoretical part of the dissertation a proposition is derived:
PROPOSITION: Given semi-log marginal costs in attributes, constant markups
over rental units, rational behavior on behalf of firms, quality adjusted prices specified as
in equation (3.20) and the presence of a Nash equilibria, then the marginal cost of any
non-tax attribute can be recovered by multiplying the marginal price of the attribute by
(1+R) where R is the inverse residual demand elasticity of the firm. Also, the marginal
cost o f the tax variable can also be recovered by multiplying the coefficient of the tax
attribute in equation (3.21) by (1+R).
Using this proposition, the marginal cost of each housing attribute, including the
tax rate, is retrieved. Then, the attributes that command the highest premium above their
marginal cost are identified. The attributes that command the highest premium above
their marginal cost are expected to be the variables that are inherently linked to the lake
or allow the renter to better enjoy the amenities provided by the presence of the lake. If
this is so, then these results will reinforce Taylor and Smith’s (2000) finding that
financial incentives exist for firms to conserve site-specific environmental amenities such
as a lake, the ocean etc.
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4.6. Computing the Magnitude of Property Tax Shifting

The marginal price and marginal cost of the property tax rate variable are used to
compute the magnitude o f property tax shifting, for the case of imperfect and perfectly
competitive rental housing markets, respectively. The objective o f the empirical exercise
is to assess the impact of varying levels of firm-specific market power on the relationship
between property taxation and the rental price of property.
The analysis concerning property tax shifting entails several assumptions: First, a
10 cent tax increase is assumed. In other words, the property tax shifting consequences of
a 10 cent increase in the property tax rate are being analyzed. Second, the rates of
property tax shifting that are computed are firm-specific average property tax shifting
rates. Third, rates of property tax shifting are computed using different values for the
discount rate and the property tax capitalization rate. In order to account for the effect of
property tax capitalization on the market value of the property, the tax rate is required.
Given that each firm operates in more than one tax jurisdiction, the median tax rate is
used. The tax rates are specified as the equalized-assessed property tax rate, hence
differences in assessment ratios are accounted for. Fourth, maintenance costs for each
property are assumed to be negligible and hence not accounted for. However, it is
important to note that maintenance costs and the rate of property tax shifting are
positively related. In other words, accounting for maintenance costs would have led to
higher rates of property tax shifting.
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Now I will present the specific steps involved in computing the rates of property
tax shifting, for the case of imperfect and perfect competition:
Consider the following hedonic regression:
InPj = ttj + SPiZj + yiti

(4.9)

where lnP; is the logarithm of the rental price of the ith property, P; is the rental
price o f the ith property, Zj is the vector of structural and location-specific housing
attributes as well as local public services and ti is the effective tax per 1000 dollars of
equalized-assessed property value.
Assume yi - 0.02. This is the marginal price of the tax rate, expressed in elasticity
form. A 10 cent tax differential leads to a 0.2 percent increase in the rental price of
housing. Let us also assume that the median rental price for the hypothetical firm in the
year of interest is $750. Then the increase in the median rental price due to the 10 cent
increase in the property tax rate is ($750)(0.Q02) = $1.5.
Assuming that this firm operates for 16 weeks, and its average occupancy rate for
these 16 weeks is 50%, then the 10 cent tax differential leads to a $12 annual difference
in rent.
The next task is to determine the market value of the median rental unit. Given
that the hypothetical firm operates for 16 weeks with an average occupancy rate of 50%,
then the median rental unit generates 750*8 =$6,000 per year. Assuming a discount rate
of 3 percent, full property tax capitalization and a median tax rate of 2 percent, then the
market value of the median rental unit is (6,000)/(0.03 +0.02) = $120,000.
Given a market value equal to $120,000, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$12 annual difference in the tax bill for the owner, $12 of which is passed onto the renter.
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Hence, the average property tax shifting for this hypothetical firm, under imperfectly
competitive conditions, is equal to 100%. A simplified formula that can be used to
compute the average rate of property tax shifting is:
Average Rate o f Tax Shifting = (yi)(discount rate + portion o f the tax rate that is
capitalized)(1000)

(4.10)

Now, let us assume that, for this firm, the coefficient of the quality adjusted
quantity index in the firm’s residual demand model (the inverse residual demand
elasticity, R) is -0.25. Hence, this firm’s price-cost markup is 25%. Multiplying the
coefficient of the tax rate in the hedonic regression, 0.02, by (1+R) yields 0.015. This is
the marginal cost of the tax rate, expressed in elasticity form. Using this figure, in lieu of
the marginal price, and repeating the aforementioned steps yields this hypothetical firm’s
average rate of property tax shifting under perfectly competitive conditions (price-cost
markup = 0). The simplified formula is:
Rate of Tax Shifting = (0.015)(discount rate + portion of the tax rate that is
capitalized)( 1000)

(4.11)

In summary, the estimation procedure can be described as a flow chart in Figure
4.1.
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FIGURE 4.1; Flow Chart Describing the Empirical Implementation
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CHAPTER V

CASE STUDY AND DATA

In this chapter, a case study of the vacation rentals market in the New Hampshire
Lakes Region is presented. The chapter begins with a description of some of the
important features o f the New Hampshire Lakes Region and the vacation rentals market.
Then, evidence that indicates that the vacation rentals market is imperfectly competitive
is presented. In the latter parts of this chapter, the data used in the case study and the data
collection process are discussed.
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5.1. The New Ham pshire Lakes Region

The Lakes Region is a geographically distinct area in central New Hampshire that
covers a total of 42 towns.8 This area consists of 273 lakes and ponds surrounded by
beaches, inns, resorts, lakefront and lake-access cottages, shopping and dining
establishments. The largest of these lakes is Lake Winnipesaukee. It is surrounded by 3
mountains, covers 72 square miles, has 183 miles of shoreline and contains 274 islands
(NH Visitors Guide, 53). Other large lakes include Squam Lake and Newfound Lake,
which consist of shorelines of 61 miles and 22 miles respectively (Squam Lake Chamber
of Commerce web-site and Newfound Lake Region Pamphlet).
The New Hampshire Lakes Region attracts a large number of tourists each year.
In the year 2000, close to 4 million visitor trips (total person days) were made to the New
Hampshire Lakes Region by visitors and 180.43 million dollars were spent on hotel
rooms and meals by visitors (Travel Barometers, The Institute of New Hampshire
Studies, 1-13). The area is not in proximity to a ski area, however the presence of the
lakes allow for a wide variety of activities including swimming, boating, sailing,
canoeing, kayaking, fishing and water-skiing. For individuals who enjoy nature and
wildlife, there are many hiking trails and campgrounds. The New Hampshire Lakes
Region is home to a great variety of animals and birds, which include the ruffed grouse,
snowshoe hare and migratory waterfowl (The Official NH Visitors Guide, 46). Also, the
Squam Lakes Natural Science Center, a 200 acre nature center with live native wildlife,
consists of nature trails, interactive exhibits and live animal programs. The New

8 A map o f the area is presented in Figure 5.1.
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Hampshire Lakes Region consists of a number of historic sites, the most notable being
the Wright Museum in which films, artifacts, military equipment and vehicles from
World War II are exhibited (Where To! Lakes Region of New Hampshire, 16-17).
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5.2. The New Hampshire Lakes Region Vacation Rentals Market

The specific market that my theoretical model will be applied to is the vacation
rentals market of the NH Lakes Region. The participants of this market are the property
owners, the property management firms and the property renters. Property owners sign a
contract with a property management firm. Under this contract, the property management
firm is responsible for renting out the property to renters and also managing the day-today needs of the property. In return for this service, the management firm receives a
commission from the property owner.
One important task, at hand, is to define the vacation rentals market of the New
Hampshire Lakes Region. Based on this definition, the boundaries o f the market must be
established. An ideal definition of a market must account for substitution possibilities in
both production and consumption. On the production side, two products that are very
different in composition may nevertheless belong to the same market if firms are able to
switch from producing one product to the other with minimal opportunity cost. On the
consumption side, two products that are considered “close” substitutes by consumers
should also be treated as products that belong to the market. One potential problem is
measuring the degree of substitutability. In other words what criteria should be used to
determine whether products are close substitutes or not? One possibility is to consider the
cross price elasticity o f demand. If the cross price elasticity between two products is high,
then these two products should be grouped together when defining the relevant market.
However, cross price elasticities vary in different price ranges (Scherer and Ross, 1990,
215).

81

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The previous paragraph describes some of the difficulties involved in defining a
market. Given these difficulties, how should the boundaries for the vacation rentals
market be set? In order to adequately address this question, both supply-side and demandside substitution possibilities must be explored. Concerning the supply-side, the vacation
rentals industry is characterized by asset specificity. In other words, establishing a
vacation rentals firm involves a lot of specific investment. For example, it requires rental
agents who are very familiar with the business and the customer base. As a result, in this
industry, supply-side substitution possibilities are very limited, if any. Concerning the
demand-side, the closest substitute to a vacation rental unit in proximity to a lake is a
vacation rental unit in proximity to an ocean. Are these two types of properties close
enough substitutes, in the eyes of a potential renter, such that it is appropriate to treat
them as products competing in the same market? In this dissertation, these two types of
properties are considered different properties, because the site-specific environmental
amenities for each type of property are sufficiently different to render these properties
non-substitutes, or at best, weak substitutes. But, what about lakefront and lake-access
properties in locations that are close to but not within the boundaries of the New
Hampshire Lakes Region, such as lakefront and lake-access properties in Maine? Should
these properties be grouped together with the properties located in the New Hampshire
Lakes Region when defining the relevant market? Providing a definitive answer to this
question is very difficult. However, the rental agents interviewed by the author have
argued that the New Hampshire Lakes Region, as a geographic region, offers so much in
terms of outdoor attractions, including nature and wildlife, and other local attractions that
it has gained a reputation throughout New England as being a distinct or “unique”
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recreational area. In this spirit, I argue that an adequate definition of the vacation rentals
market should include all firms that rent lakefront and lake-access properties in the
geographic location known as the New Hampshire Lakes Region. This geographic
location encompasses all o f the towns that are in proximity to Lake Winnipesaukee and
the surrounding smaller lakes, and Newfound Lake.
Given the aforementioned market definition, the vacations rentals market of the
NH Lakes Region is led by six firms. The first two firms, hereafter referred to as Firm 1
and Firm 2, are the largest firms with an inventory of approximately eighty to one
hundred rental units in any given year. Firm 3 and Firm 4 are the medium-sized firms
with between fifty to sixty rental units in any given year. Finally, Firm 5 and Firm 6
represent the smaller-sized firms; these two firms manage approximately forty rental
units each year.
There are a number of firms that rent out less then forty rental units per year.
These firms are generally not considered part of the industry for the following reasons:
First, and foremost, these firms are primarily in the real estate sales business. They
manage very few rental properties, some as few as three. They do not have a separate
rentals division; the rental units are managed by the real estate sales division.
Furthermore, the prime business focus of some of these firms is long-term rentals and in
some cases emergency housing rentals (if there is a hospital in the city).
Information obtained from rental agents indicates that there is market
segmentation within the New Hampshire Lakes Region vacation rentals market.
Discussions with rental agents who work for the six firms and a close examination of the
records of the three firms for which detailed data was available (Firm 1, Firm 2 and Firm
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3) reveal that firms which operate in the Newfound Lake area do not manage properties
near Lake Winnipesaukee or the smaller lakes surrounding it, and vice versa. Hence, the
market is divided up into two segments: The first is the Newfound Lake area, which
encompasses the towns of Bristol, Alexandria, Bridgewater and Hebron. The second is
the Winnipesaukee Lake and surrounding area. This segment encompasses the towns of
Alton, Tilton, Moultonborough, Center Harbor, Meredith, Laconia, Gilford, Alton,
Wolfeboro, Tuftonborough, Sandwich, Belmont, Gilmanton and Ossipee. Firm 3 and
Firm 5 operate in the Newfound Lake area, while Firm 1, Firm 2, Firm 4 and Firm 6
operate in the Winnipesaukee Lake and surrounding area. Each firm’s competitors are
only those firms that operate in the same market segment.
The firms in the New Hampshire Lakes Region vacation rentals market can be
classified into three categories, namely large-sized firms, medium-sized firms and
smaller-sized firms. A complete set of data was available for Firm 1, Firm 2 and Firm 3,
hence my sample is limited to these three firms. As a result, my sample consists of two
larger-sized firm and one medium-sized firm. Since the purpose of the empirical model,
in more general terms, is to examine firm pricing behavior in the presence of imperfect
competition and property taxation, I would have liked to have had a representative of
each firm size in my sample. However, including a smaller-sized firm is not feasible for
the following reason: In the empirical model, I employ hedonic methods to determine the
contribution o f each housing attribute to the rental price of housing. Smaller-sized firms
manage no more than forty rental units per year. Hence, a hedonic regression for a
smaller-sized firm would have no more than forty observations; forty observations are not
sufficient to consistently estimate the parameters of the hedonic regression. However, it is
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important to note that even though hedonic regressions (and residual demand models) are
not estimated for these smaller firms, their supply response is accounted for in the
residual demand models of the larger firms (Firm 1, Firm 2 and Firm 3), since the costs
o f these firms are included as regressors in the residual demand models.
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5.3. Evidence of Imperfect Competition in the Vacation Rentals Market

There is considerable evidence indicating that the vacation rentals market is an
imperfectly competitive market. First, there is theoretical evidence. Experimental studies
have demonstrated that posted price markets give rise to supra-competitive price levels
(Davis and Holt, 1993). The vacation rentals market is a posted price market. A posted
price market is one in which suppliers quote a price at the beginning of a sales period and
demanders shop for and choose the best offer. Second, there is empirical evidence. Taylor
and Smith (2000) find that the demand faced by vacation rental management firms is
imperfectly elastic. Third, the NH Lakes Region vacation rentals market is controlled by
very few firms. These firms are very similar in structure. Each firm, with the exception of
one, is composed o f a rentals and sales division. The structural similarities among firms
and their sparse numbers may facilitate anti-competitive behavior such as parallel pricing
and/or tacit collusion. Fourth, there is market segmentation. This issue is discussed in the
previous section.
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5.4. Property Taxation in the State of New Hampshire

New Hampshire is an ideal state to study local fiscal policy, because of its unique
tax code. Government expenditure, in New Hampshire, is financed primarily by three
types o f taxes, namely an income tax, a sales tax and a property tax. The income tax is
levied only on dividends and interest. The sales tax, on the other hand, is levied only on
meals and rooms (Shapiro, England, Kenyon and Connor, 1999,1). The absence of a
broad-based sales and income tax renders property taxes the prime source of local
government revenue.
In the state ofNew Hampshire, property taxes vary by municipality. Each
municipality determines its property tax rate, based on appropriations, incoming revenues
and the assessed value o f property. Each municipality annually holds county delegation
meetings and city council meetings. During these meetings, elected representatives vote
on appropriations that are necessary to fund the public services administered in the
municipality. Also, a complete revaluation of property within the municipality is
conducted to determine the municipality’s “local assessed property value.” The purpose
of this revaluation is to ensure that the assessed value reflects the “true” or “market”
value o f property and that each property owner’s tax burden is consistent with the value
of his/her property. A revaluation is not conducted each year. The revaluation establishes
“base year” property values. In the years that follow (years in which a revaluation is not
conducted), the assessors examine the changes that take place since the base year, such as
new construction and additions to the property, to determine the assessed value o f
property (Arnold, 1999, 1-4).
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The equation for determining the property tax rate is:

Property = [(VA - IR)/LAPV]* 1000

(5.1)

Tax Rate
where VA denotes voted appropriations, IR denotes incoming revenue and LAPV
represents the local assessed property value. The tax rate is expressed per one thousand
dollars of valuation (Arnold, 1999, 1-4).
Municipalities do not conduct revaluations in the same year. Hence, generally, the
assessed value of property will be closer to its market value for municipalities that
recently conducted their revaluation relative to those whose last revaluation dates back a
few years. This discrepancy arising from differences in revaluation years along with
idiosyncratic differences in assessment practices render comparison of property taxes
among municipalities very difficult. The Department of Revenue Administration
conducts an equalization process, annually, to adjust for these differences. This new
“equalized” tax rate allows for comparison across municipalities. To derive the equalized
property tax rate, the Department of Revenue Administration undertakes a meticulous
investigation o f property sales within each municipality. These sales are compared to the
assessed property value to derive an “assessment ratio.” For instance, an assessment ratio
equal to 85 percent implies that the municipality assessed property at approximately 85
percent of its full/market value.
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Once the assessment ratio is derived, the “property tax per 1000 dollars of
equalized-assessed property value” is computed as follows:

Equalized Property = [(VA - IR)/LAPV*AS]* 1000
Tax Rate
where VA, IR, LAPV are defined as before and AS is the assessment ratio
(Arnold, 1999, 1-4),
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(5.2)

5.5. Firm-Specific Data

A complete set of firm-specific data is available for the years 2000 and 1999 for
Firm 1 and the years 2000, 1999 and 1998 for Firm 2 and Firm 3. Hence, a total of 8
hedonic rent functions are estimated. All firm-specific data are collected directly from the
firm’s rental records. The firm-specific data can be divided into two groups, namely
housing attributes and firm costs:
A complete list o f all housing attributes used in my empirical model and their
definitions are provided in Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. The definitions are based on the
definitions used by realtors. Basic descriptive statistics for all of these variables are
provided in Tables 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11. The housing attributes that are
considered in my empirical model can be divided into seven categories, namely, the
rental price, season variables, variables that account for property size, variables that
account for housing quality, lake related variables, local government appropriation
variables and the property tax rate. The rental price is the price paid by renters for renting
the property for a week. It is important to note that actual property values for rental units
are unavailable. Hence, property tax shifting rates are computed using market values that
are obtained by summing up the present value of the future stream of rental payments.
Dummy variables are used in order to account for the highly seasonal nature of the
vacation rentals market. A typical year is made up of three seasons, namely pre season,
peak season and post season. Only one firm, namely Firm 1, has a peak, post and pre
season for all years. Firm 2 does not distinguish among seasons. Almost all o f its
inventory is rented out during peak season. Any rental arrangements made marginally
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before or after the peak season are subject to peak season prices. Firm 3 also rents out
most of its inventory during peak season. However, in 1999 and 1998, Firm 3 rented out
a few properties during post season, hence a peak season dummy variable is included in
the 1999 and 1998 hedonic rent equations o f Firm 3. Any property that is rented out in
more than one season is considered a separate property for each of those seasons and
hence is accounted for as a separate rental unit in the hedonic model. Maximum
occupancy number and the number of bathrooms make up the housing size variables. The
housing quality category consists of variables that measure quality such as whether the
rental unit is classified as a contemporary unit, whether it has a fireplace etc. The
environmental amenity-related variables capture the impact that the environmental
amenity, namely the lake, has on the rental price of the property. Examples include
whether the property is waterfront or not, whether it has a view of the lake or not etc. The
local government appropriation variables are used as control variables for measuring the
impact of the property tax rate on the rental price. Examples of these variables are the
town-specific appropriations per capita for highways and streets and the appropriations
per capita for police services. The final category, the property tax rate, is the tax bill, in
dollars, per one thousand dollars of equalized property value.
Each firm’s costs are made up of two components, namely costs associated with
cleaning the rental unit each time the unit is vacated and rental agent costs. Rental agents
work on a commission basis. Hence, for each firm, the sum of all commission payments
made to rental agents make up the rental agent costs. The administrative assistants work
for both the rentals and sales department of each firm, and are on the sales department’s
payroll.
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After each rental unit is vacated, the unit is cleaned up by a cleaning team whose
members work for hourly wages. The total cost associated with hiring this team is
referred to as “cleaning costs ” Cleaning costs do not accrue to the firm. These costs are
either deducted from the payments received by the owner, or there is a mandatory
cleaning fee charged to each renter on top of the rental price. Hence, these costs are
passed onto either the owner or renter. Thus, the only costs incurred by the firm are rental
agent fees.
For each of the firms that provided detailed occupancy records, very precise
weekly total revenue figures are computed. The firm-specific average occupancy rates by
season and year are provided in Table 5.12. Using the confidential annual personal
income figure o f a rental agent (this rental agent is the only rental agent working for the
firm in question), I am able to compute the percentage (of the weekly rental price) that
each rental agent receives as commission once the unit is rented out. It is simply the
firm’s annual total revenue divided by the rental agent’s personal annual income. It is
approximately equal to a third for all firms. Hence dividing the firm’s weekly total
revenues by three, yields the weekly rental agent costs for each of these firms.
For the firms for which occupancy information is not available, rudimentary cost
figures are computed using the following methodology: I call up each of these firms and
ask the rental agents to provide me with the average number of units rented out in a
typical week for each month of each year (generally the numbers do not vary from year to
year). Basically, I am trying to obtain a monthly capacity utilization rate. Then, I compute
the mean rental price for each firm for each year. Using the mean rental prices and the
capacity utilization figures, I compute weekly total revenue. By dividing the weekly total
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revenue by three (rental agent costs make up a third of total revenue), I obtain the weekly
rental agent costs for each of these firms. For each of these firms, costs vary on a monthly
basis, while for the other group of firms, costs vary on a weekly basis.
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5.6. Industry-Specific Data and Demand Proxy Variables

The industry-specific data used in my empirical model is a wage index for real
estate brokers, agents and managers (SIC two-digit code 56) in New Hampshire. The
wage index is constructed as follows: I divide the total quarterly wages for SIC Code 56,
by the number of weeks in each quarter (13) to obtain weekly wages. The wage index is
obtained by dividing weekly wages by weekly employment. The New Hampshire
quarterly wage and employment data for SIC Code 56 are obtained from the State ofNew
Hampshire Department of Employment Security. The wage index varies on a monthly
basis, hence for each week of a given month, the wage index is the same.
Finally, the demand proxy variables are two wage indexes, one for eating and
drinking establishments (SIC two-digit code 58) and the other for hotel and other lodging
places (SIC two-digit code 70), and dummy variables identifying national holidays. The
methodology used in constructing these wage indexes is identical to that o f the wage
index for real estate brokers, agents and managers (SIC two-digit code 56). The raw data
are obtained from the State ofN ew Hampshire Department of Employment Security.
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FIGURE 5.1: M ao of the New Hampshire Lakes Region
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TABLE 5.1: Variable Names and Definitions: Rental Price and Seasonal Dummy
Variables

Definition

Variable Name

PRIOO

The rental price o f the property in die year 2000.

PRI99

H ie rental price o f the property in die year 1999.

PRI98

The rental price o f the property in die year 1998.

PEAKOO

Dummy variable equal to one if die property was available for rent in the peak season of
2000 (between July 1st and September 2nd), zero odierwise.

PEAK99

Dummy variable equal to one if the property was available for rent in the peak season of
1999 (between June 26® and August 28®), zero otherwise.

PEAK98

Dummy variable equal to one if the property was available for rent in the peak season of
1998 (between June 27® and September 5th), zero otherwise.

PKEOO/POSTOO

Dummy variable equal to one if the property was available for rent in the pre/post season of
2000 (pre season 2000 begins May 13® and ends July 1st; post season 2000 begins September
2nd and ends October 16*), zero odierwise.

PRE99/POST99

Dummy variable equal to one if the property was available for rent in the pre/post season of
1999 (pre season 1999 begins May 15* and ends June 26®; post season 1999 begins August
28* and ends October 16*), zero otherwise.

PRE98/POST98

Dummy variable equal to one if the property was available for rent in the pre/post season of
1998 (pre season 1998 begins May 16* and ends June 27*; post season 1998 begins
September 5* and ends October 17th), zero otherwise.
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TABLE 5.2: Variable Names and Definitions: Property Size and Property Quality

Variable Name

MAXOCC

Definition

The maximum number of individuals that the property can accommodate.

BATHS

The number of bathrooms.

FPLACE

Dummy variable equal to one if a fireplace is available, zero otherwise.

GRLAWN

Dummy variable equal to one if the property possesses a grassy lawn, zero otherwise.

CONTEM

Dummy variable equal to one if the property is characterized as “contemporary”, zero otherwise.
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TABLE 5.3: Variable Names and Definitions: Lake Related Variables

Variable Name

W FRONT

Definition

Dummy variable equal to one if the property is waterfront, zero otherwise.

L V IE W

Dummy variable equal to one if the property has a view o f the lake, zero otherwise.

ISL A N D

Dummy variable equal to one if the property is on an island, zero otherwise.

SD

Secchi disc measure of water clarity, in feet.

DOCK

Dummy variable equal to one if a dock is available, zero otherwise.

DECK

Dummy variable equal to one if a deck is available, zero otherwise.

SPORCH

BOCAN

RAFT

Dummy variable equal to one if a screen porch is available, zero otherwise.

Dummy variable equal to one if a boat/canoe is available, zero otherwise.

Dummy variable equal to one if a raft is available, zero otherwise.
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TABLE 5.4: Variable Names and Definitions; Local Government Appropriations
and the Property Tax Rate

Variable Name

Definition

FIRE99/98/97

Local government appropriations, per capita, devoted to the Fire and Safety Department in
the year 1999/1998/1997 in US dollars.

AM B99/98/97

Local government appropriations, per capita, devoted to ambulance services in the year
1999/1998/1997 in US dollars.

HSTR99/98/97

Local government appropriations, per capita, devoted to maintaining and constructing
highways and streets in the year 1999/1998/1997 in US dollars.

POL99/98/97

Local government appropriations, per capita, devoted to police services in the year
1999/1998/1997 in US dollars.

TAX99/98/97

Full value property tax per one thousand dollars o f equalized property value in the year
1999/1998/1997.
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TABLE 5.5: Basic Descriptive Statistics for Firm l ’s Year 2000 Variables

V A R IA B L E S

M EAN

M E D IA N

STD . D EV.

M IN .

M AX.

P R I0 0

1 1 2 2.82

9 8 7 .5 0

6 6 1 .1 5

40 0.00

3 7 2 5 .0 0

PEAKOO

0.41

0

0.49

0

1.00

PO ST0O

0 .30

0

0 .4 6

0

1.00

M AXOCC

7.49

7.00

2.93

2.00

18.00

BATHS

1.90

2.00

0.86

1.00

4.00

W FRONT

0 .5 6

1.00

0.50

0

1.00

2

L V IE W

0 .35

0

0.48

0

1.00

0

IS L A N D

0 .0 2 6 6

0

0.1611

0

1.00

0

SD

5.22

5.00

1.12

4.00

9.52

0

DOCK

0.60

1.00

0.49

0

1.00

FPLACE

0.48

0

0.50

0

1.00

RAFT

0 .0 4

0

0.20

0

2.00

GRLAW N

0.10

0

0.30

0

1.00

CONTEM

0.07

0

0.25

0

1.00

BOCAN

0 .0 8

0

0.35

0

1.00

T A X 99

15.36

12.90

3.76

12.90

27 .1 0

H ST R 99

2 1 4 .5 6

2 1 5 .5 4

86.42

60.69

4 3 0 .3 9

A M B99

32 .8 9

3 6 .3 4

17.30

0

65 .1 7

F IR E 9 9

72.71

70 .9 9

14.67

27.45

105.69

YEAR
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TABLE 5.6: Basic Descriptive Statistics for Firm l ’s Year 1999 Variables

V A R IA B L E S

M EAN

M E D IA N

STD . DEV.

M IN .

M AX.

P R I9 9

9 3 8 .4 7

900

4 3 5 .2 6

40 0.00

3 0 0 0 .0 0

P E A K 99

0 .4 0

0

0 .4 9

0

1.00

PO ST 99

0 .3 0

0

0 .4 6

0

1.00

M AXOCC

7.21

7.00

1.96

4.00

18.00

BATHS

1.61

1.50

1.60

0.75

4.00

W FRONT

0 .5 8

1.00

0.50

0

1.00

1

L V IE W

0 .36

0

0 .4 8

0

1.00

9

DOCK

0 .58

1.00

0.49

0

1.00

9

DECK

0 .7 7

1.00

0.42

0

1.00

9

SPORCH

0.45

0

0.51

0

1.00

CONTEM

0.03

0

0.16

0

1.00

BOCAN

0 .0 7

0

0 .2 8

0

2 .0 0

T A X 98

13.96

9 .2 8

7.11

9.28

3 2 .6 4

H ST R 98

2 0 7 .9 7

2 2 5 .1 2

53.05

52.17

2 7 9 .9 6

P O L98

1 2 6.84

126.15

12.26

84.15

146.13

A M B 98

3 0 .7 0

3 5 .8 2

12.83

0

38 .4 6

YEAR

101

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE 5.7: Basic Descriptive Statistics for Firm 2’s Variables

V A R IA B L E S

M EAN

M E D IA N

STD . D EV.

M IN .

M AX.

PRI00

1259.89

1250.00

563.88

275.00

3000.00

M AXOCC

6.37

6.00

1.67

3.00

13.00

BATHS

1.56

1.00

0.71

0

4.00

W FRO NT

0.61

1.00

0.49

0

1.00

SD

5.91

5.74

0.86

5.00

9.52

D ECK

0.49

0

0.50

0

1.00

TAX99

14.28

12.91

2.59

12.91

21.04

FIRE99

67.94

71.00

13.82

5.90

105.70

HSTR99

229.64

215.54

90.97

41.66

457.86

PRI99

1214.86

1237.50

482.55

525.00

2575.00

M AXOCC

6.54

6.00

1.41

4.00

10.00

1

BATHS

1.60

1.25

0.74

0

4.00

9

W FR O N T

0.62

1.00

0.49

0

2.00

9

SD

6.61

6.69

0.55

5.14

7.27

Q

D EC K

0.53

1.00

0.50

0

1.00

TAX98

11.77

9.28

5.03

9.28

26.03

HSTR98

131.23

127.12

38.68

42.61

245.40

PO L98

80.44

71.24

25.37

23.88

142.92

FERE98

41.40

39.18

14.15

13.14

100.12

PRX98

1153.68

1112.50

458.95

525.00

2500.00

M AX O CC

6.32

6.00

1.32

4.00

10.00

BATHS

1.52

1.00

0.74

0

4.00

W FR O N T

0.63

1.00

0.49

0

1.00

FPLA C E

0.39

0

0.55

0

2.00

9

D EC K

0.59

1.00

0.50

0

1.00

8

TAX97

11.51

9.30

4.54

9.30

26.70

PO L97

100.12

122.74

9.57

85.27

136.70

FERE97

61.89

65.45

12.32

33.74

93.67

YEAR

2
0
0
0

1
9
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TABLE 5.8: Basic Descriptive Statistics for Firm 3’s Variables

V A R IA B L E S

M EAN

M E D IA N

STD . D EV .

M IN .

M AX.

PRI00

864.41

900.00

178.30

375.00

1300.00

M AXOCC

5.88

6.00

1.45

4.00

12.00

2

BATHS

1.57

1.50

0.68

0.75

3.00

0

W FR O N T

0.53

1.00

0.50

0

1.00

0

LVIEW

0.25

0

0.44

0

1.00

0

TAX99

16.93

20.32

4.70

10.28

20.40

FIRE99

27.50

30.81

15.40

7.93

61.31

PO L99

89.21

65.17

55.11

37.06

164.76

PRI99

826.04

862.50

172.36

475.00

1300

PEA K99

0.90

1.00

0.31

0

1.00

M AXOCC

5.96

6.00

1.44

4.00.

12.00

BATHS

1.62

1.50

0.66

0.75

3.00

W FR O N T

0.58

1.00

0.50

0

1.00

LVIEW

0.27

0

0.45

0

1.00

TAX98

22.65

25.11

6.17

7.72

26.04

AMB98

33.65

5.42

34.38

0

73.89

PO L98

83,36

61.15

46.53

37.59

136.94

PRI98

785.80

775.00

157.32

350.00

1200.00

PEAK98

0.86

1.00

0.35

0

1.00

1

M AX O CC

5.93

6.00

111

4.00

8.00

9

BATHS

1.59

1.50

0.69

0.75

3.00

9

W FR O N T

0.68

1.00

0.47

0

1.00

8

LVIEW

0.25

0

0.44

0

1.00

SPO R C H

0.66

1.00

0.48

0

1.00

D O CK

0.36

0

0.49

0

1.00

TAX97

24.08

26.16

7.91

7.36

29.15

HSTR97

119.39

144.93

64.96

29.92

175.71

YEAR

1
9
9
9
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TABLE 5.9: Basic Descriptive Statistics: Weekly Wage and Weekly Cost Indexes
used in Firm l ’s Residual Demand Model

VARIABLES

MEAN

MEDIAN

STD. DEV.

MIN.

MAX.

WAGE INDEX
FOR SIC CODE
58

228.43

231.85

15.09

202.95

252.91

COST INDEX
FOR THE
INDUSTRY

563.60

565.39

34.19

504.21

603.30

1061.96

648.88

1019.69

0

2853.05

COST INDEX
FOR FIRM 1’S
COMPETITORS
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TABLE 5.10: Basic Descriptive Statistics: Weekly Wage and Weekly Cost Indexes
used in Firm 2’s Residual Demand Model

VARIABLES

M EA N

MEDIAN

STD. DEV.

MIN.

M AX.

WAGE INDEX
FOR SIC CODE
70

289.47

291.50

44.28

224.82

370.55

COST INDEX
FOR THE
INDUSTRY

543.54

545.86

44.85

466.97

603.30

1966.73

2557.83

1030.13

130.00

3338.93

COST INDEX
FOR FIRM 2’S
COMPETITORS
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TABLE 5.11: Basic Descriptive Statistics: Weekly W age and Weekly Cost Indexes
used in Firm 3’s Residual Demand Model

V A R IA B LES

M EA N

MEDIAN

STD, DEV.

M IN .

M AX.

WAGE INDEX
FOR SIC CODE
70

289.62

293.89

42.50

224.82

370.55

COST INDEX
FOR THE
INDUSTRY

540.68

545.86

42.87

466.97

603.30

1182.15

1643.00

620.23

333.00

1825.00

COST INDEX
FOR FIRM 3’S
COMPETITORS
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TABLE 5.12: Occupancy Rates bv Year and Season

YEAR

SEASON

F IR M 1

FIRM 2

F IR M 3

PRE
SEASON

21.67%

11.80%

5.39%

PEAK
SEASON

55.74%

53.20%

61.70%

POST
SEASON

14.78%

5.39%

9.80%

ANNUAL

34.07%

32.00%

42.30%

PRE
SEASON

17.61%

5.26%

13.30%

PEAK
SEASON

58.20%

57.50%

62.60%

POST
SEASON

19.02%

15.80%

9.80%

ANNUAL

37.05%

48.90%

41.00%

PRE
SEASON

15.40%

6.19%

PEAK
SEASON

61.80%

63.63%

POST
SEASON

24.00%

11.36%

57.00%

43.38%

2
0
'

0
0

1
Q

y

9
9

1
Q
7

9
8

ANNUAL

-
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CHAPTER VI

EM PIRICAL RESULTS

6.1. The Hedonic Regression Results

The estimation results of the hedonic rent equations are presented in Table 6.1,
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. All eight hedonic rent regressions are statistically robust. The Rsquared statistic for each o f these regressions is very high. Given the semi-log functional
form, the coefficients represent the percentage change in rent resulting from a one unit
change in the explanatory variable. The coefficients for most of the attributes are
statistically significant. Multicollinearity tests are conducted for each hedonic rent
regression. The tests indicate the presence of low to moderate levels of multicollinearity.
The hedonic rent results for the year 2000 are presented in Table 6.1. For Firm 1,
the attributes that have the largest coefficient are PEAK, CONTEM, DOCK, LVIEW,
RAFT, WFRONT and BOCAN. The weekly rental price of a rental unit rented out in
peak season is thirty-one percent greater than an identical unit that is not rented out in
peak season. Also, the weekly rental price of a house that is categorized as contemporary
is almost twenty-two percent greater than an identical one that is not. Concerning the
attributes DOCK and LVIEW, the rental price of a unit that possesses either one of these
attributes is approximately twenty-two percent greater than an identical one that does not.
The price of a rental unit that possesses either a raft or a boat/canoe or is waterfront is
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approximately nineteen percent greater than an identical one that does/is not. Concerning
the hedonic rent results for Firm 2, the coefficients of the WFRONT and DECK variables
are very high. The rental price of a property that is categorized as waterfront is almost
thirty-six percent greater than an identical one that is not, while one that possesses a deck
is almost twenty-nine percent greater than one that is not. For Firm 3, the attributes that
have very large coefficients are the two lake related variables, namely WFRONT and
LVIEW.
The hedonic rent results for the year 1999 are presented in Table 6.2. For Firm 1,
the attributes that command the highest premiums are PEAK and CONTEM. Other
attributes that possess large coefficients are WFRONT, BOCAN, DOCK and BATHS.
For Firm 2, the attribute whose presence leads to the largest percentage increase in rental
price is WFRONT. Also, the coefficient of DECK is very large. The rental price of a unit
with a deck is twenty-two percent greater than an identical property without one. As
before, the variables with the largest coefficients, for Firm 3, are WFRONT and LVIEW.
In 1999, Firm 3 had both a peak and a post season, hence the PEAK dummy variable is
included in the hedonic rent regression. The coefficient of this variable is equal to 0.25,
indicating that, the rental price of a property rented out during peak season is twenty-five
percent greater than an identical one that is not.
The hedonic rent results for the year 1998 are presented in Table 6.3. The results
are similar to those of 1999 and 2000. However, concerning Table 6.3, two points are
worth noting: First, for Firm 2, the coefficient of DECK is very large, larger than that of
some key attributes such as WFRONT and BATHS. Second, for Firm 3, the variable
BATHS, is not statistically significant. Both of these results are quite surprising.
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In general, the variables that contribute greatest, in percentage terms, to the rental
price are the variables that are inherently linked to the lake (WFRONT, LVIEW, DOCK,
DECK, SPORCH, BOCAN and RAFT) and the variable that differentiates between a
luxury and non-luxury property, namely CONTEM. In spite of SD being a lake related
variable, its coefficient is small relative to the coefficients of the other lake related
variables.
Some o f the public service variables are insignificant and incorrectly signed.
However, these variables are control variables, and not variables that are being examined.
Finally, the coefficient of the property tax variable is relatively constant across
firms and years. It varies between 0.0117 and 0.0171. Hence, a dollar increase in the tax
bill per 1000 dollars of equalized property value gives rise to a percentage increase in the
weekly rental price that ranges from 1.2 to 1.7 percent.
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6.2.The Residual Demand Model Estimation Results

The weekly rent and quantity indexes, along with the demand, industry cost and
firm-specific cost variables are utilized to estimate a residual demand model. A residual
demand model is estimated for each of the three firms, using two years of data for Firm 1
and three years of data for Firm 2 and Firm 3. The observations for each of the firms are
weekly measures. For Firm 1, the observations encompass three seasons for two years,
while for Firm 2 and Firm 3, the observations include three seasons and three years,
however, for these firms, the pre and post season is very short.
There were no significant disruptions to tourism in the New Hampshire Lakes
Region throughout the years 1998, 1999 and 2000. Furthermore, to the knowledge of the
numerous rental agents interviewed by the author, neither the vacation rentals market nor
the businesses themselves have experienced any disruption or significant change in the
aforementioned years. Hence, it is assumed that the demand faced by each of these firms
is stable over the studied years. As a result, I expect the market power exercised by these
firms to be relatively stable over these years.
The equation below represents the residual demand model:
InPit = F(lnQ;t, lnYt, lnWt, lnW.it, eit)

(6.1)

where F is linear function. Pit and Q;t denote the quality adjusted rent and quantity
indexes for Firm i, respectively. Yt represents the group of demand proxy variables. The
demand proxy variables used in my model are two wage indexes, one for eating and
drinking establishments (SIC two-digit code 58) and the other for hotel and other lodging
places (SIC two-digit code 70), and dummy variables identifying national holidays. It is
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expected that the coefficient of the SIC code 58 wage index be negatively correlated with
rental price, since vacation rental hpmes and eating and drinking establishments are
complementary goods. It is also expected that the coefficient of the second wage index be
positively correlated with rental price, since vacation rental homes and hotels/lodging
places are substitutes. Wt is the group of variables that account for industry-wide
influences on costs in week t. Industry-wide influences on costs are captured by a wage
index for New Hampshire real estate brokers, agents and managers (SIC two-digit code
56). The methodology used in constructing all of the aforementioned wage indexes is
outlined in Chapter Five. W.;t is the firm-specific costs of all firms except Firm i. It is the
weighted average o f the costs of all o f Firm i’s competitors, the weight being the market
share of each competitor. £jt is the error term.
Since the residual demand equation is of double log functional form, all
parameters are elasticities. The parameter for quantity represents the inverse price
elasticity o f demand for the firm; a negative and statistically significant coefficient
indicates that the firm is able to exercise market power.
Tests for autocorrelation indicate that the residual demand models for Firm 1 and
Firm 2 are plagued by first order autocorrelation, while that ofFirm 3 is plagued by
second order autocorrelation. Also, the residual demand model is a semi-reduced
demand-supply model, hence the quality adjusted quantity index, Q, is endogenous. A
method proposed by Fair (1970) is used to estimate the residual demand models in the
presence of simultaneity bias and autocorrelation. The methodology gives rise to
consistent results.
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The steps involved are as follows:
1)

Regress Qt against a set of instrumental variables that are uncorrelated with the
error term to obtain predicted Qt (Q*t). These variables should include Yt, Wt, W.jt
and the appropriate lagged values of Qt, Yt, Wt, W.jt. For example, if the residual
demand model follows an autoregressive process of order two, then the lagged
values that need to be included are Qt-2 , Yt-2 , Wt-2 , W.jt-2 .

2)

Estimate a second stage regression in which Pt is regressed on Q*t, Yt, Wt, W.it.
However, before estimating the second stage regression, transform the data for
purposes of correcting for autocorrelation. Again, if the model follows an
autoregressive process of order two, then all exogenous variables, included in the
second stage estimation, must be transformed as follows:
P*t ~ P t" pPt-2

(6.2)

Q**t = Q*t - pQt-2

(6.3)

The residual demand model is now written as follows:
lnP*t = lnQ**t + lnY*t + lnW*t + lnW \it

(6.4)

Fair (1970)’s methodology is used to estimate each residual demand model. Once
the estimation is complete, each model is tested for heteroskedasticity. The results of the
tests indicate that the residual demand model for Firm 2 is heteroskedastic. The corrected
standard errors are used to re-compute the t-statistic of each of the coefficients in Firm
2’s residual demand model.
Past studies that use the residual demand technique report estimation results that
vary significantly across firms (Baker and Bresnahan, 1988; Taylor and Smith, 2000).
With the exception of the demand proxy variables (and of course the variable
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representing quantity which is always negative due to the law of demand), there seems to
be no consistency in the signs of the coefficients of identical variables across firms.
Furthermore, there seems to be considerable variation in the size of the coefficients of
identical variables across firms. These results suggest that firms may respond differently
to changes in industry and firm-specific costs, and that their response to changes in
demand may be different in magnitude.
The results o f the firm-specific residual demand models are provided in Table 6.4.
All o f the demand proxy variables are correctly signed with the exception of the Holidays
variable for Firm 3’s residual demand model. This variable is included in the final
specification, because of its theoretical significance. Generally, a price-cost markup equal
to or greater than twenty percent is considered strong evidence of anticompetitive pricing
(Taylor and Smith, 2000). Firm 1, Firm 2 and Firm 3’s estimated markups are 26.05%,
31.61% and 6.17% respectively.
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6.3. The M arginal Price and M arginal Cost of Attributes

The marginal price of each attribute is the coefficient of the attribute multiplied
by the median rental price. The marginal cost estimates are recovered by multiplying the
marginal price by (1+R) where R is the inverse residual demand elasticity of the firm.
Note that the marginal cost estimates for the categorical variables are not exactly the
“marginal” cost estimates, because these variables are not continuous. The marginal cost
estimate for a categorical variable, such as WFRONT, represents the dollar change in the
rental price resulting from the presence of the categorical variable. In other words, it
represents the difference in the rental price of two properties that are identical in all
respects, except in one the categorical variable is present, in the other it is not.
In general the attributes that derive product-differentiating market power for the
firms are the property size attributes (MAXOCC and BATHS), the attribute that
distinguishes between a luxury and non-luxury property, namely CONTEM, and the
attributes that are linked to the environmental amenity, namely the lake (WFRONT,
LVIEW, DOCK, DECK, RAFT, SPORCH and BOCAN).
Tables 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 provide the marginal cost and the marginal price estimates
of the aforementioned groups of attributes. For Firm 1, the difference between the
marginal price and marginal cost for BATHS, WFRONT, LVIEW, CONTEM, DOCK
and BOCAN is very high, indicating that Firm 1 derives a substantial portion of its
market power from these attributes. On the other hand, Firm 2 ’s primary source of market
power is WFRONT and DECK, while much of Firm 3’s market power is derived from
both WFRONT and LVIEW.
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The aforementioned findings clearly indicate that much of the market power
exercised by the firms is derived from the environmental amenity, namely the lake. More
specifically, the attributes that command very high premiums above their marginal cost
are those variables that are inherently linked to the lake (WFRONT and LVIEW), or
allow the renter to better enjoy the amenities provided by the presence of the lake
(BOCAN, RAFT, SPORCH, DOCK, DECK). The important conclusion that can be
drawn from this analysis is that financial incentives exist for firms to conserve sitespecific environmental amenities such as a lake, the ocean etc.
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6.4. Property Tax Shifting Under Imperfect and Perfect Competition

In this section, the rates o f property tax shifting for the case of perfect and
imperfect competition are computed. The occupancy rates, provided in Table 5.12, are
used to compute the magnitudes of property tax shifting. The methodology used is
outlined in Chapter IV. Also, the computational details involved in calculating the rates
of property tax shifting for Firm 1 in the year 2000 for the case of imperfect and perfect
competition are presented in Appendix 8.4 and Appendix 8.5 respectively.
The tax shifting results are presented in Tables 6.8, 6.9, 6.10, 6.11, 6.12, 6.13,
6.14 and 6.15. Each table is designed to provide statistics concerning the annual property
tax shifting rate for a given firm in a given year. Each table is composed of two rows. The
first row displays the property tax shifting rate under imperfect competition, while the
second row displays the property tax shifting rate under perfect competition (price-cost
markup =0). The property tax shifting rates are very sensitive to the discount rate. The
discount rates used in the literature range from three percent to eight percent. Hence, the
rates o f property tax shifting are computed using three different discounts rates, namely
three percent, five percent and eight percent. Also, the rates of tax shifting are sensitive to
the property tax capitalization rate. In the literature, almost all of the tax capitalization
rates reported fall between zero percent and one hundred percent. As a result, rates of tax
shifting are computed using three different values for the property tax capitalization rate,
namely zero percent, fifty percent and one hundred percent. For simplicity, property
maintenance costs are assumed to be zero. The relationship between the computed rates
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of property tax shifting, the discount rate and the property tax capitalization rate is
illustrated in Figures 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6.
Examining the tables, it is clear to see that the extent o f property tax shifting
achieved by all three firms is quite high, and in some cases greater than one hundred
percent. A rate greater than one hundred percent implies that the firm is able to pass more
than the owner’s tax liability onto the renter. A significant portion of the property tax
shifting achieved by Firm 1 and Firm 2 is due to the presence of imperfect competition.
However, the contribution of market structure to Firm 3’s ability to shift taxes is very
small; in all three years, the difference in the property tax shifting rates for Firm 3 under
perfect and imperfect competition is very small.
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TABLE 6.1: Hedonic Rent Results for the Year 2000

Variable

FIRM1

FERM2

FIRM3

INTERCEPT

5.33078 (54.00)**

5.4737 (20.96)**

5.84904(45.88)**

PEAK00

0.30908 (10.24)**

-

-

POSTOO

0.00383 (0.12)
0.07391 (12.52)**

0.06715 (4.78)**

0.05738 (3.95)**

BATHS
FPLACE

0.17821 (8.39)**

0.12236 (3.85)**

0.08129 (2.36)**

0.07671 (2.73)**

-

-

GRLAWN

0.13915(3.12)**

-

-

CONTEM
DOCK

0.22369 (3.92)**

-

0.21801 (5.54)**

-

-

DECK

-

0.28614(5.33)**

-

-

MAXOCC

RAFT

0.19271 (2.79)**

SPORCH
BOCAN

-

-

-

0.19010(4.90)**

-

-

WFRONT

0.19762(5.50)**

0.35859 (6.49)**

0.19376(5.26)**

LVIEW

0.21455 (7.03)**

ISLAND

0.14599(1.76)

-

-

SD

-

0.04591 (1.31)

-

AMB99

0.01147 (3.31)**

-

FJRE99

-

0.00167(1.06)

0.00458 (2.27)**

HSTR99

-0.00207 (-3.31)**

0.00014544 (0.57)

-

POL99
TAX99

0.01260(2.09)*

0.01511 (1.73)*

-0.00052481 (-0.89)
0.01225(1.86)*

R1

0.8327

0.8336

0.7477

N

301

94

51

0.13800(3.20)**

■-

- The dependent variable is InPRIOO.
- Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. T-statistics denoted by “**” are significant at a
five percent significance level. T-statistics denoted by

are significant at a ten

percent significance level.
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TABLE 6.2: Hedonic Rent Results for the Year 1999

Variable

FIRM1

FIRM2

FIRMS

INTERCEPT

5.35778 (43.95)**

5.17063(21.77)**

5.48051 (22.67)**

PEAK99

0.28233 (8.89)**

-

0.25131 (4.05)**

POST99

0.02619(0.78)
0.04480 (5.49)**

0.07052(5.18)**

0.05240 (3.39)**

0.17136(8.30)**

0.12868 (4.80)**

0.03907(1.08)
0.06944(1.67)

MAXOCC
BATHS
FPLACE

-

0.07948 (2.55)*

GRLAWN

-

-

-

CONTEM
DOCK

0.32341 (3.90)**

-

0.16526 (3.67)**

-

-

DECK

0.09965 (2.99)**

0.21981 (4.48)**

-

RAFT

-

-

SPORCH
BOCAN

0.11444(4.20)**

-

-

0.16846(3.57)**

-

-

WFRONT

0.23418(5.22)**

0.44393 (8.63)**

0.17969(4.61)**

LVIEW

0.13794(3.84)**

-

0.09092(1.90)*

ISLAND

-

-

-

SD

-

0.06949(1.79)*

-

AMB98

0.00988 (2.76)**

-

-

FIRE98

-

0.00539(1.80)*

0.00843(1.73)

HSTR98

-0.00084 (-1.45)*

0.00221(1.65)

-

POL98
TAX98

0.01170(3.40)**

-0.00515 (-2.17)**
0.01711 (3.32)**

-0.00185 (-1.41)
0.01664(2.02)**

Rz

0.7448

0.9010

0.7441

N

278

78

48

- The dependent variable is lnPRI99.
- Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. T-statistics denoted by “**” are significant at a
five percent significance level. T-statistics denoted by

are significant at a ten

percent significance level.
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TABLE 6.3: Hedonic Rent Results for the Year 1998

Variable

FJLRM1

FIRM2

FIRMS

INTERCEPT

-

5.42237(19.86)**

5.28580(25.13)**

PEAK98

-

-

0.17966 (3.41)**

POST98

-

-

MAXQCC

-

0.05921 (3.66)**

0.06170(2.91)**

BATHS
FPLACE

-

0.11899(4.13)**

0.04952 (1.37)

-

0.09779 (2.90)**

-

GRLAWN

-

-

-

CONTEM
DOCK

-

-

-

-

0.12413(2.33)**

DECK

-

0.34428 (4.69)**

-

RAFT

-

-

SPORCH
BOCAN

-

-

0.11260(2.35)**

-

-

-

WFRONT

-

0.28491 (3.79)**

0.19313(4.44)**

LVIEW

-

-

0.14742 (3.25)**

.

-

-

-

SD

-

-

-

AMB97

-

-

-

FERE97

-

0.00177(1.06)

0.00891 (2.08)**

HSTR97

-

-

-

POL97
TAX97

-

0.00239(1.24)
0.01466 (3.25)**

-0.00165 (-1.26)
0.01527(2.33)**

RJ

-

0.8904

0.8143

N

-

74

44

ISLAND

.

- The dependent variable is lnPRI98,
- Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. T-statistics denoted by “**” are significant at a
five percent significance level. T-statistics denoted by

are significant at a ten

percent significance level.
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TABLE 6.4: Residual Demand Model Estimation Results

VARIABLES

FIRM1

FIR M 2

F IR M 3

Intercept

8.57160 (2.73)**

7.95767 (1.63)**

5.03362 (5.05)**

Log (Quality Adjusted
Quantity)

-0.26055 (-4.92)**

-0.31613 (-3.72)**

-0.06171 (-2.95)**

Log (Cost Index for the
Industry)

2.16470(4.43)**

-2.38835 (-4.06)**

0.17622 (0.94)

Log (Cost Index for the
F inn’s competitors)

0.16509 (7.49)**

0.77670(11.14)**

0.11875(2.80)**

Holidays

0.17896(2.91)**

0.14590(1.25)

-0.07253 (-1.94)*

Log (Wage Index for
SIC Code 58)

-2.84637 (-6.13)**

-

-

Log (Wage Index for
SIC Code 70)

-

1.70270 (1.73)*

0.19477 (1.90)**

R-Square

0.8122

0.8527

0.5741

F-Value

31.14

41.68

10.51

,

- The dependent variable is the logarithm of the quality adjusted rent index.
- Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. T-statistics denoted by “**” are significant at a
five percent significance level. T-statistics denoted by

are significant at a ten

percent significance level.
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TABLE 6.5: Year 2000-Marginal Price and Marginal Cost of a Selected Num ber of
Attributes

PRODUCT ATTRIBUTES
MAXOCC

BATHS

CONTEM

WFRONT

LVIEW

SD

DOCK

DECK

ISLAND

RAFT

BOCAN

Marginal

FIRM
1

Price

71.99

177.85

235.62

174.09

224.75

215.87

123.14

188.81

171.33

(5.83)

(20.94)

(5639)

(35.55)

(30.12)

(38.91)

(81.96)

(68.24)

(3832)

Marginal
Cost

54.05

130.33

163.60

144.51

156.95

159.43

(4.26)

(1124)

(19.64)

(1336)

(14.70)

(15.66)

'

106.78

140.93

139.03

(2142)

(20.62)

(13.76)

Marginal

FIRM
2

Price

83.94

152.95

448.24

5739

357.63

(17.50)

(39.63)

(69.13)

(43.63)

(67.13)

Marginal
Cost

57.51

104.79

307.09

39.32

245.01

(11.25)

(2234)

(55.16)

(17.62)

(46.33)

Marginal

FIRM
3

Price

50.23

71.14

169.58

120.75

(12.69)

(30.10)

(32.29)

(37.31)

47.12

65.75

159.11

113.30

(1.60)

(3.07)

(4,85)

(4-30)

-

Marginal
Cost

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
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TABLE 6.6: Year 1999-Marginal Price and M arginal Cost of a Selected Number of
Attributes

PRODUCT ATTRIBUTES
MAXOCC

BATHS

CONTEM

WFRONT

LVIEW

SD

DOCK

DECK

SPORCH

RAFT

BOCAN

Marginal

FIRM
1

Price

41.06

154.12

304.50

200.29

133.86

150.93

95.17

103.93

(7.48)

(18.89)

(75.74)

(41.06)

(32:67)

(41.15)

(30.48)

(24.91)

30.41

115.83

218.55

158.27

93.19

111.71

67.38

77.31

113.87

(2.99)

(9.84)

(25.94)

(15.40)

(11.28)

(13.59)

(9.53)

(8.67)

(14.20)

-

157.32
(43.07)

Marginal
Cost
Marginal

FIRM
2

Price

87.24

159.26

549.33

86.01

272.00

(16.83)

(33.17)

(63.68)

(48.14)

(60.76)

Marginal
Cost

59.77

109.11

376.34

58.92

186.34

(6.52)

(12.68)

(24.33)

(18.24)

(23.10)

Marginal

FIRM
3

Price

44.54

33.24

152.75

77.27

(13.18)

(30.86)

(33.15)

(40.80)

41.79

31.18

143.32

72.50

0-54)

(2-75)

(4.58)

(3.94)

'

Marginal
Cost

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
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.

-

TABLE 6.7: Year 1998-Marginal Price and M arginal Cost of a Selected Number of
Attributes

PRODUCT ATTRIBUTES
MAXOCC

BATHS

CONTEM

WFRONT

LVIEW

SD

DOCK

DECK

SPORCH

RAFT

BOCAN

Marginal
*

FIRM
1

Price
Marginal
-

Cost
Marginal

FIRM
2

Price

65.86

132.39

316.95

383.03

(17.91)

(32.04)

(83.66)

(81.55)

Marginal

Cost

45.12

90.70

217.14

262.42

(9.84)

(18.77)

(46.69)

(51.71)

Marginal

FIRM
3

Price

47.82

38.36

149.65

114.24

96.18

87.26

(16.43)

(27.90)

(33.71)

(35.11)

(41.23)

(37.12)

44.87

36.00

140.42

107.19

90.24

81.88

(1.80)

(2.55)

(4.55)

(4.03)

(4.19)

(3.78)

Marginal

Cost

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
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'

TABLE 6.8: Year 2000 Property Tax Shifting for Firm I

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 0%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 50%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 100%

Discount
Rate = 3%

37.80%
(0.1809)

47.48%
(0.2272)

57.15%
(0.2735)

Discount
Rate = 5%

63.00%
(0.3015)

72.68%
(0.3478)

82.35%
(0.3941)

Discount
Rate = 8%

100.80%
(0.4824)

110.48%
(0.5287)

120.15%
(0.5750)

Discount
Rate = 3%

27.96%
(0.1338)

35.12%
(0.1680)

42.28%
(0.2023)

Discount
Rate = 5%

46.60%
(0.2230)

53.76%
(0.2572)

60.92%
(0.2915)

Discount
Rate = 8%

74.56%
(0.3568)

81.72%
(0.3910)

88.88%
(0.4253)

TOTAL ANNUAL PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
IMPERFECT
COMPETITION

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
PERFECT
COMPETITION
(PRICE-COST
MARKUP =0)

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
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TABLE 6.9: Year 1999 Property Tax Shifting for Firm 1

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 0%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 50%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 100%

Discount
Rate = 3%

35.10%
(0.1032)

43.27%
(0.1272)

51.43%
(0.1512)

Discount
Rate = 5%

58.50%
(0.1720)

66.67%
(0.1960)

74.83%
(0.2200)

Discount
Rate = 8%

93.60%
(0.2752)

101.77%
(0.2992)

109.93%
(0.3232)

Discount
Rate = 3%

25.96%
(0.0763)

32.00%
(0.0941)

38.03%
(0.1118)

Discount
Rate = 5%

43.26%
(0.1272)

49.30%
(0.1450)

55.34%
(0.1627)

Discount
Rate = 8%

69.22%
(0.2035)

75.26%
(0.2213)

81.30%
(0.2391)

TOTAL ANNUAL PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
IMPERFECT
COMPETITION

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
PERFECT
COMPETITION
(PRICE-COST
MARKUP =0)

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
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TABLE 6.10: Year 2000 Property Tax Shifting for Firm 2

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 0%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 50%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 100%

Discount
Rate = 3%

45.33%
(0.2619)

56.12%
(0.3242)

66.91%
(0.3866)

Discount
Rate = 5%

75.55%
(0.4365)

86.34%
(0.4988)

97.13%
(0.5612)

Discount
Rate = 8 %

120.88 %
(0.6983)

131.67%
(0.7607)

142.46%
(0.8231)

Discount
Rate = 3%

31.00%
(0.1791)

38.38%
(0.2217)

45.76%
(0.2644)

Discount
Rate = 5%

51.67%
(0.2985)

59.05%
(0.3412)

66.43%
(0.3838)

Discount
Rate = 8 %

82.66%
(0.4776)

90.05%
(0.5203)

97.43%
(0.5629)

TOTAL ANNUAL PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
IMPERFECT
COMPETITION

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
PERFECT
COMPETITION
(PRICE-COST
MARKUP =0)

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
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TABLE 6.11: Y ear 1999 Property Tax Shifting for Firm 2

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 0%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 50%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 100%

Discount
Rate = 3%

51.33%
(0.1545)

61.40%
(0.1848)

71.47%
(0.2151)

Discount
Rate = 5%

85.55%
(0.2575)

95.62%
(0.2878)

105.69%
(0.3181)

Discount
Rate = 8%

136.88%
(0.4120)

146.95%
(0.4423)

157.02%
(0.4726)

Discount
Rate = 3%

35.10%
(0.1057)

41.99%
(0.1264)

48.88%
(0.1471)

Discount
Rate = 5%

58.51%
(0.1761)

65.39%
(0.1968)

72.28%
(0.2176)

Discount
Rate = 8%

93.61%
(0.2818)

100.50%
(0.3025)

107.38%
(0.3232)

TOTAL ANNUAL PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
IMPERFECT
COMPETITION

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
PERFECT
COMPETITION
(PRICE-COST
MARKUP =0)

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
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TABLE 6.12: Year 1998 Property Tax Shifting for Firm 2

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 0%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 50%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 100%

Discount
Rate = 3%

43.98%
(0.1356)

52.42%
(0.1616)

60.85%
(0.1876)

Discount
Rate = 5%

73.30%
(0.2260)

81.74%
(0.2520)

90.17%
(0.2780)

Discount
Rate = 8%

117.28%
(0.3616)

125.72%
(0.3876)

134.15%
(0.4136)

Discount
Rate = 3%

30.08%
(0.0927)

35.85%
(0.1105)

41.62%
(0.1283)

Discount
Rate = 5%

50.13%
(0.1546)

55.89%
(0.1724)

61.67%
(0.1901)

Discount
Rate = 8%

80.21%
(0.2472)

85.97%
(0.2651)

91.75%
(0.2829)

TOTAL ANNUAL PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
IMPERFECT
COMPETITION

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
PERFECT
COMPETITION
(PRICE-COST
MARKUP =0)

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
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TABLE 6.13: Year 2000 Property Tax Shifting for Firm 3

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 0%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 50%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 100%

Discount
Rate = 3%

36.75%
(0.1974)

49.20%
(0.2643)

61.64%
(0.3311)

Discount
Rate = 5%

61.25%
(0.3290)

73.70%
(0.3959)

86.14%
(0.4627)

Discount
Rate = 8%

98.00%
(0.5264)

110.45%
(0.5934)

122.89%
(0.6601)

Discount
Rate = 3%

34.48%
(0.1852)

46.16%
(0.2479)

57.84%
(0.3107)

Discount
Rate = 5%

57.47%
(0.3087)

69.15%
(0.3714)

80.83%
(0.4342)

Discount
Rate = 8%

91.95%
(0.4939)

103.63%
(0.5566)

115.31%
(0.6194)

TOTAL ANNUAL PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
IMPERFECT
COMPETITION

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
PERFECT
COMPETITION
(PRICE-COST
MARKUP =0)

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
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TABLE 6.14: Year 1999 Property Tax Shifting for Firm 3

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 0%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 50%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 100%

Discount
Rate = 3%

49.92%
(0.2475)

68.76%
(0.3409)

87.61%
(0.4344)

Discount
Rate = 5%

83.20%
(0.4125)

102.04%
(0.5059)

120.89%
(0.5994)

Discount
Rate = 8%

133.12%
(0.6600)

151.96%
(0.7534)

170.81%
(0.8469)

Discount
Rate = 3%

46.84%
(0.2322)

64.52%
(0.3199)

82.20%
(0.4076)

Discount
Rate = 5%

78.07%
(0.3870)

95.75%
(0.4747)

113.43%
(0.5624)

Discount
Rate = 8%

124.91%
(0.6193)

142.59%
(0.7069)

160.27%
(0.7946)

TOTAL ANNUAL PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
IMPERFECT
COMPETITION

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
PERFECT
COMPETITION
(PRICE-COST
MARKUP =0)

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
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TABLE 6.15: Year 1998 Property Tax Shifting for Firm 3

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 0%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 50%

Property
Tax
Capitalization
Rate = 100%

Discount
Rate = 3%

45.81%
(0.1968)

64.20%
(0.2758)

82.58%
(0.3548)

Discount
Rate = 5%

76.35%
(0.3280)

94.74%
(0.4070)

113.12%
(0.4860)

Discount
Rate = 8%

122.16%
(0.5248)

140.55%
(0.6038)

158.93%
(0.6828)

Discount
Rate = 3%

42.98%
(0.1847)

60.23%
(0.2588)

77.48%
(0.3329)

Discount
Rate = 5%

71.64%
(0.3078)

88.89%
(0.3819)

106.14%
(0.4560)

Discount
Rate = 8%

114.62%
(0.4924)

131.87%
(0.5665)

149.12%
(0.6406)

TOTAL ANNUAL PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
IMPERFECT
COMPETITION

PROPERTY
TAX SHIFTING
UNDER
PERFECT
COMPETITION
(PRICE-COST
MARKUP =0)

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
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FIG U R E 6.1: Property Tax Shifting under Varying Discount Rates: The Case of

Imperfect Competition and a Zero Percent Property Tax Capitalization Rate
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FIGURE 6.2: Property Tax Shifting under Varying Discount Rates: The Case of

Rate of Property Tax Shifting

Imperfect Competition and a Fifty Percent Property Tax Capitalization Rate
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FIGURE 6.3: Property Tax Shifting under Varying Discount Rates: The Case of
Imperfect Competition and a One Hundred Percent Property Tax Capitalization
Rate
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CO

□ Firm

FIGURE 6.4: Property Tax Shifting under Varying Discount Rates: The Case of
Perfect Competition and a Zero Percent Property Tax Capitalization Rate
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FIGURE 6.5: Property Tax Shifting under Varying Discount Rates: The Case of
Perfect Competition and a Fifty Percent Property Tax Capitalization Rate
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FIGURE 6.6: Property Tax Shifting under Varying Discount Rates: The Case of

Rate of Property Tax Shifting

Perfect Competition and a One Hundred Percent Property Tax Capitalization Rate
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

One of the objectives of this dissertation is to examine whether financial
incentives exist for firms to conserve environmental amenities such as lakes and oceans.
The hedonic method is used to estimate the marginal price of each property attribute.
Then a series of steps are taken to recover the marginal cost of each property attribute.
The results indicate that most of the market power exercised by each of the firms is
derived from the environmental amenity, namely the lake. More specifically, the
attributes that command very high premiums above their marginal cost are the attributes
that are inherently linked to the lake (WFRONT and LVIEW), or the attributes that allow
the renter to better enjoy the amenities provided by the presence of the lake (BOCAN,
DOCK, DECK, RAFT and SPORCH). The most important conclusion that can be drawn
from this analysis is that financial incentives exist for firms to conserve site-specific
environmental amenities.
Another objective o f this dissertation is to assess, using hedonic methods, the
impact of market structure on the relationship between property taxation and the rental
price o f property. There are a plethora of studies that utilize hedonic methods to
empirically examine the relationship between property taxation and the sales/rental price
o f properties. A detailed presentation of these studies is provided in Chapter II.
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These studies implicitly assume highly competitive housing markets. This is a required
assumption since Rosen (1974)’s theoretical results are derived under this assumption.
However, not all housing markets are highly competitive. In this dissertation, the
competitive markets assumption is relaxed. In the theoretical part of this dissertation, the
hedonic framework is extended to accommodate both market structure and the local
public sector. In the empirical part, for each firm, the average rate of property tax shifting
under the current (less competitive) market structure and the rate that would prevail under
perfectly competitive conditions are derived.
This exercise discloses some very interesting findings. First, in general, the
property tax shifting rate for all of the firms is significantly high, and in some cases
greater than 100%. This implies that, in these specific cases, the firm is able to pass more
than the owner’s property tax liability onto the renter. The demand for vacation rentals in
the New Hampshire Lakes Region is primarily made up of out-of-state visitors, mostly
from southern New England states. However, statistics concerning the residency of the
property owners are not readily available. If the majority of the property owners are New
Hampshire residents, then this result may imply that tax exporting is taking place. On the
other hand, if the majority o f the property owners are non-residents, then this result may
suggest that tax redistribution among non-residents is taking place rather than tax
exporting. Second, a significant portion of the property tax shifting achieved by Firm 1
and Firm 2 is due to the presence of imperfect competition. The contribution of market
structure to Firm 3’s ability to shift property taxes is small. A general conclusion that can
be drawn from this finding is the following: In a less competitive rental housing market,
depending on the degree of the market power exercised by the firm, the structure of the
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market may significantly augment the firm’s ability to shift property taxes from property
owners to property renters. This result can be further interpreted as indicating that, in
certain cases, the simplifying assumption of competitive housing markets that all past
studies have appealed to, may not be valid.
The issues addressed in this dissertation are ripe for further investigation. In other
words, there are many opportunities for future research:
The question of whether financial incentives exist for firms to conserve
environmental amenities is very important. The findings of this dissertation reaffirm
Taylor and Smith’s (2000) conclusion that such financial incentives exist. The work done
in this dissertation is an improvement over Taylor and Smith (2000), because the analysis
accounts for the local public sector. Future researchers should further examine the link
between market structure and the local public sector and investigate whether local public
policy may be able to augment the financial incentives that exist for firms to conserve
environmental amenities.
Concerning the relationship between property taxation and the rental price of
housing, this dissertation concludes that the structure of the market may have a
significant impact on the extent of property tax shifting. The methodology that is used in
this dissertation to account for the impact of market structure on the relationship between
property taxation and the sales/rental price of property can be readily applied to other
areas. For example, the methodology can be used to examine the impact of market
structure on the extent to which a per-unit tax is capitalized into the price o f a composite
product.

142

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDICES

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX 8.1

MCFADDEN’S THEOREM

Theorem: Suppose that individual utility is specified by equation (3.1) and G is a
nonnegative function defined over RN which satisfies the following:
1)

G is homogeneous to degree one.

2)

G approaches infinity as any of its arguments approach infinity.

3)

The partial derivatives of G with respect to n distinct variables exist and are
continuous, nonnegative if n is odd, and positive if n is even, n= 1,...,N.
Furthermore, assume that the distribution function F(s) = exp [-G(e81,..., esN)]

has finite moments, and define an aggregate indirect utility as follows:
V [(K p1,Z i),...,.K p i,z1), Y] = m M>0(Y/M) +

M lnG[[i|)(p1,z1)-1,...,ij)(pi.z1)-1]

(A8.1)

Then:
1)

Expected demand

2)

V is a utilitarian social welfare function for the individual utilities in equation

Xj

= M x ;P i equals

-(3 V /3 p j)/(3 V /3 Y ).

(3.1).
3)

V is convex in (pl5.. .,P n ) provided that ln0;(pj,

z;)

is concave in p;.
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APPENDIX 8.2

FEENSTRA’S RESULT

The third term in equation (3.20) will equal zero if and only if:
k+l
(A8.2)

This equality holds if and only if dn jdqi is homogeneous to degree one.
Homogeneity to degree one implies that 7ti(q;, Xi) is of the form:

7ti(qi, Xi) = 7ti(qi, Xj) + gi(Xj)

(A8.3)

where 7ii(qi, Xi) is homogeneous to degree one in Xi. Inverting (A8.3) yields a
quality adjusted price o f the general form:
0j(Pi, Xi) = 0i [(pi - gi(Xi), Xi]

(ASA)

where 0j is homogenous to degree one in all of its arguments. A special case of
(A8.4), with the restriction that hi is homogenous to degree one, is:
0i(pi, Xj) = \|/j [(pi - gj(Xi)/hi(Xi)]

(A8.5)
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APPENDIX 8.3

EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM

Since the hedonic approach is an equilibrium approach, it is necessary to
demonstrate that the model reaches equilibrium. One sufficient condition to attain an
interior maximum is to assume that profits are quasi-concave in a firm’s own prices and
attributes. If this is so, then the objective function is quasi-concave in attributes. If an
interior maximum is attained at z*i, then the objective function must be locally concave
around this point. This implies that the matrix of the second order condition for the
maximization problem is negative semi-definite in a neighborhood of z*i (Feenstra, 1995,
638-639).
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APPENDIX 8.4

RATES OF PROPERTY TAX SHIFTING UNDER IMPERFECT COMPETITION
FOR FIRM 1 IN THE YEAR 2000

A. Computing the Annual Rent Differential due to the Ten Cent Increase in Tax per
One Thousand Dollars of Assessed Property Value

lnPj = (3X; + 0.0126ti,

(A8.6)

where P; is the rental price, Xj denotes the vector of explanatory variables other
than the tax rate, and t; denotes the full value tax per 1000 dollars of assessed property
value.
10 cent tax differential = 0.126 percentage change in weekly rent.
Median rental price for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = $987.5.
10 cent tax differential = (0.00126)($987.5) = $1.24 weekly rent differential.
Annual rent differential = (total number of weeks, in the year, in which the firm
rents out at least one property) (average annual occupancy rate) (1.24).
Annual rent differential = (22)(0.3407)(1.24) = $9.33.
Annual Rental Income from Median Property = ($987.5)(22)(0.3407) =
$7,401.71.
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B. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming a Three Percent Discount Rate and
No Property Tax Capitalization

Median tax rate for Firm 1’s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion o f the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 0%.
Market Value of Median Property = $7,401.71/(0.03 + 0) = $246,724.

Given median property value = $246,724, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$24.67 annual change in the owners tax liability, $9.33/$24.67 = 37.80% of which is
passed onto the renter.

C. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming a Five Percent Discount Rate and
No Property Tax Capitalization

Median tax rate for Firm F s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 0%.
Market Value of Median Property = $7,402.71/(0.05 + 0) = $148,038.
Given median property value = $148,038, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$14.80 annual change in the owners tax liability, $9.33/$14.80 = 63.00% of which is
passed onto the renter.
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D. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming an Eight Percent Discount Rate and
No Property Tax Capitalization

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 0%.
Market Value of Median Property = $7,402.71/(0.08 + 0) = $92,521.
Given median property value = $92,521, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$9,252 annual change in the owners tax liability, $9.33/$9.25 = 100.80% of which is
passed onto the renter.

E. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming a Three Percent Discount Rate and
a Property Tax Capitalization Rate of Fifty Percent

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 0.77%.
Market Value of Median Property = $7,402.71/(0.03 + 0.0077) = $196,436.
Given median property value = $196,436, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$19.64 annual change in the owners tax liability, $9.33/$19.64 = 47.48% of which is
passed onto the renter.
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F. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming a Five Percent Discount Rate and a
Property Tax Capitalization Rate of Fifty Percent

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 0.77%.
Market Value of Median Property = $7,402.71/(0.05 + 0.0077) = $128,324.
Given median property value = $128,324, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$12.83 annual change in the owners tax liability, $9.33/$12.83 = 72.68% of which is
passed onto the renter.

G. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming an Eight Percent Discount Rate and
a Property Tax Capitalization Rate of Fifty Percent

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 0.77%.
Market Value ofMedian Property = $7,402.71/(0.08 + 0.0077) = $84,417.
Given median property value = $84,417, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$8,442 annual change in the owners tax liability, $9.33/$8.442 = 110.48% of which is
passed onto the renter.
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H. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming a Three Percent Discount Rate and
a Property Tax Capitalization Rate of One Hundred Percent

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 1.536%.
Market Value ofMedian Property = $7,402.71/(0.03 + 0.01536) = $163,177.
Given median property value = $163,177, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$16.32 annual change in the owners tax liability, $9.33/$16.32 = 57.15% of which is
passed onto the renter.

I. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming a Five Percent Discount Rate and a
Property Tax Capitalization Rate of One Hundred Percent

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 1.536%.
Market Value ofMedian Property = $7,402.71/(0.05 + 0.01536) - $113,245.
Given median property value = $113,245, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$11.32 annual change in the owners tax liability, $9.33/$ 11.32 = 82.35% of which is
passed onto the renter.
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J. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming an Eight Percent Discount Rate and
a Property Tax Capitalization Rate of One Hundred Percent

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory - 1.536%.
The portion o f the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 1.536%.
Market Value ofMedian Property = $7,402.71/(0.08 + 0.01536) = $77,618.
Given median property value = $77,618, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$7.76 annual change in the owners tax liability, $9.33/$7.76 = 120.15% of which is
passed onto the renter.
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APPENDIX 8.5

RATES OF PROPERTY TAX SHIFTING UNDER PERFECT COMPETITION
FOR FIRM 1 IN THE YEAR 2000

A. Computing the Annual Rent Differential due to the Ten Cent Increase in Tax per
One Thousand Dollars of Assessed Property Value

InPj = pXi + 0.0126tj,

(A8.7)

where P; is the rental price, X; denotes the vector of explanatory variables other
than the tax rate, and U denotes the full value tax per 1000 dollars of assessed property
value.
Marginal cost of the tax rate = (0.0126) (1- 0.2606) = 0.0093.
10 cent tax differential = 0.93 percentage change in weekly rent.
Median rental price for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = $987.5.
10 cent tax differential = (0.00093)($987.5) = $0.92 weekly rent differential.
Annual rent differential = (total number of weeks, in the year, in which the firm
rents out at least one property) (average annual occupancy rate) (0.92).
Annual rent differential = (22)(0.3407)(0.92) = $6.90.
Annual Rental Income from Median Property = ($987.5)(22)(0.3407) =
$7,401.71.
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B. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming a Three Percent Discount Rate and
No Property Tax Capitalization

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 0%.
Market Value ofMedian Property = $7,401.71/(0.03 +

0)

= $246,724.

Given median property value = $246,724, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$24.67 annual change in the owners tax liability, $6.90/$24.67 = 27.96% of which is
passed onto the renter.

C. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming a Five Percent Discount Rate and
No Property Tax Capitalization

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 0%.
Market Value ofMedian Property = $7,401.71/(0.05 + 0) = $148,034.
Given median property value = $148,034, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$14.80 annual change in the owners tax liability, $6.90/$14.80 = 46.60% of which is
passed onto the renter.
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P . The Rate of P ro p e rty Tax Shifting Assuming an Eight Percent Discount Rate and
No Property Tax Capitalization

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory - 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 0%.
Market Value ofMedian Property = $7,401.71/(0.08 + 0) = $92,521.
Given median property value = $92,521, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$9.25 annual change in the owners tax liability, $6.90/$9.25 = 74.56% of which is passed
onto the renter.

E. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming a Three Percent Discount Rate and
a Property Tax Capitalization Rate of Fifty Percent

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 0.77%.
Market Value ofMedian Property = $7,401.71/(0.03 + 0.0077) = $196,436.
Given median property value = $196,436, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$19.64 annual change in the owners tax liability, $6.90/$19.64 = 35.12% of which is
passed onto the renter.
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F. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming a Five Percent Discount Rate and a
Property Tax Capitalization Rate of Fifty Percent

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 0.77%.
Market Value ofMedian Property = $7,401.71/(0.05 + 0.0077) = $128,324.
Given median property value = $128,324, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$12.83 annual change in the owners tax liability, $6.90/$12.83 = 53.76% of which is
passed onto the renter.

G. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming an Eight Percent Discount Rate and
a Property Tax Capitalization Rate of Fifty Percent

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 0.77%.
Market Value ofMedian Property = $7,401.71/(0.08 + 0.0077) = $84,417.
Given median property value = $84,417, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$8.44 annual change in the owners tax liability, $6.90/$8.44 = 81.72% of which is passed
onto the renter.
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H. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming a Three Percent Discount Rate and
a Property Tax Capitalization Rate of One Hundred Percent

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 1.536%.
Market Value ofMedian Property = $7,401.71/(0.03 + 0.01536) = $163,177.
Given median property value = $163,177, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$16.32 annual change in the owners tax liability, $6.90/$16.32 = 42.28% of which is
passed onto the renter.

I. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming a Five Percent Discount Rate and a
Property Tax Capitalization Rate of One Hundred Percent

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 1.536%.
Market Value ofMedian Property = $7,401.71/(0.05 + 0.01536) = $113,245.
Given median property value = $113,245, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$11.32 annual change in the owners tax liability, $6.90/$l 1.32 = 60.92% of which is
passed onto the renter.
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J. The Rate of Property Tax Shifting Assuming an Eight Percent Discount Rate and

a Property Tax Capitalization Rate of One Hundred Percent

Median tax rate for Firm l ’s year 2000 inventory = 1.536%.
The portion of the tax rate that is capitalized into the price of property = 1.536%.
Market Value ofM edian Property = $7,401.71/(0.08 + 0.01536) = $77,619.
Given median property value = $77,619, then a 10 cent tax differential leads to a
$7.76 annual change in the owners tax liability, $6.90/$7.76 = 88.88% of which is passed
onto the renter.
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